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The withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union (Brexit) is not only a source of political and legal upheaval in
Europe but will also prompt a recalibration of transatlantic treaty
relations. This Article argues that it is a gross oversimplification to
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Member States, which are conditioned also by the foreign relations
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the “high politics” area of security and defense will be easier than
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these arguments, this Article delves into three levels of complexity:
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between the EU and United States and by which the UK will cease
to be covered; second, the transatlantic implications of available alternative models to EU membership for the UK; and third, the way
forward in ensuring continuity and bringing about future agreements and cooperation in the EU-UK-U.S. triangle, seeing that the
EU itself is a moving target due to ongoing reform efforts.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of the referendum in the United Kingdom
(“UK”) on the country’s continued membership of the European
Union (“EU”), Timothy Garton Ash anticipated that “[a]cres of
newsprint and gigabytes of web space will be devoted over the
next weeks and months to the grim mechanics of disentangling the
UK from the EU.”1 Academic circles have not lagged behind in
this effort. A veritable ‘library of Brexit’ has emerged,2 including in
legal scholarship.3
Meanwhile, across the Atlantic, weary of negative repercussions of a disorderly withdrawal, the United States (“U.S.”) government urged both sides to move the withdrawal process “forward swiftly and without unnecessary acrimony.”4 The U.S. does
so with good reasons. There is a pressing need for a better and
more complete understanding of the impact of Brexit on the U.S.
1 Timothy Garton Ash, As an English European, This Is the Biggest Defeat of My
(June
24,
2016),
Political
Life,
GUARDIAN
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/commentisfree/2016/jun/24/lifelongenglish-european-the-biggest-defeat-of-my-political-life-timothy-garton-ashbrexit [https://perma.cc/RM52-KZ3E].
2 See generally GEOFFREY EVANS & ANAND MENON, BREXIT AND B RITISH POLITICS
(2017) (exploring how the changing nature of British politics and the lasting evolution of Britain’s relations with the EU shaped the outcome of the referendum
and what that outcome itself might mean for the future form of UK politics);
HAROLD D. CLARKE ET AL., BREXIT: WHY BRITAIN VOTED TO LEAVE THE EUROPEAN
UNION (2017) (drawing upon ten years of survey data to explain why a majority of
UK voters decided to ignore the national and international community and vote
for Brexit); LEE MCGOWAN, PREPARING FOR BREXIT: ACTORS, NEGOTIATIONS AND
CONSEQUENCES (2018) (contextualizing Brexit’s negotiation process by analyzing
the internal regional dimension with a specific focus on Northern Ireland).
3
See generally THE LAW & POLITICS OF BREXIT (Federico Fabbrini ed., 2017)
(discussing the constitutional implications of Brexit for the UK and EU); THE UK
AFTER BREXIT: LEGAL AND POLICY CHALLENGES (Michael Dougan ed., 2017) (analyzing the effects of de-Europeanisation on the UK legal system); KENNETH A.
ARMSTRONG, BREXIT TIME: LEAVING THE EU – WHY, HOW AND WHEN? (2017)
(providing an objective presentation of data and arguments to track decisions that
shaped Brexit up to the point of the UK’s notification of its intention to withdraw
from the EU); GETTING TO BREXIT: LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE PROCESS OF THE UK’S
WITHDRAWAL FROM THE EU (Jennifer A. Hillman & Gary Horlick eds., 2017)
(providing an overview of salient legal issues raised by the UK’s decision to withdraw from the EU, with a particular focus on international trade).
4
See U.S. Sec’y of State Rex W. Tillerson, The U.S. and Europe: Strengthening
Western
Alliances,
(Nov.
28,
2017),
https://www.state.gov/secretary/20172018tillerson/remarks/2017/11/276002.h
tm [https://perma.cc/H25B-HURY] (discussing then current foreign policy issues
for the U.S., such as its relationships with the EU and UK).
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and its relations with the EU and the UK. A number of the ties that
link the two sides of the Atlantic in the form of international
agreements risk being untangled, as the UK will no longer be covered by agreements concluded by the EU. Moreover, as the UK
will no longer be on the inside of EU foreign policy, new transatlantic agreements that cover the U.S., the EU, and the UK will become more difficult to achieve.
In the face of this challenge, this Article puts the focus on the
transatlantic dimension of Brexit; more precisely, it investigates
how the treaty relations that the U.S. entertains with the EU and
the UK will be affected. In doing so, the Article delves into three
levels of analysis and develops a two-pronged argument. The first
level of analysis concerns a legal-empirical problem, i.e., treaty law
as it currently stands between the U.S., EU and UK. The second
level concerns the transatlantic implications and trade-offs of the
different models for post-Brexit UK-EU relations. Lastly, the third
level concerns the way forward, i.e., ensuring continuity of existing
agreements and the shifting parameters for future ones. Hence, the
Article not only provides analysis for what Garton Ash called the
“grim mechanics”5 of disentanglement. It also addresses future reengagement to shed light on the prospects of a “kinder, gentler
Brexit”6 in a wider transatlantic context, both in the immediate aftermath of withdrawal as well as in the longer term.
Throughout these three levels, the first prong of the argument
put forward here is that it would be a gross oversimplification to
conceive of transatlantic relations as a set of old and new bilateral
relationships governed by public international law only. Instead,
they need to be conceived as both multilevel and triangular. They
are multilevel because these relationships are conditioned also by
the domestic laws of the U.S., the UK, and the EU and its remaining Member States. For instance, a future U.S.-UK trade agreement
will be contingent upon both what international law allows and the
ability to meet constitutional hurdles within each country to conclude and ratify such an agreement as a deal. Consequently, the
various recalibration exercises prompted by Brexit are as much
considerations of international (treaty) law as they are “compara-

Ash, supra note 1.
See Joseph H. H. Weiler, Editorial: The Case for a Kinder, Gentler Brexit, 28
EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 1–4 (2017) (rebutting policy rationale in support of the EU’s bellicosity towards a post-Brexit UK, arguing instead that it would be in the Union’s
best interest to extend the same privileges accorded to third parties).
5
6
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tive foreign relations law”7 in action. From this realization flows
also the need to understand these relationships as triangular. In
economic terms, the transatlantic space has already been aptly described as a “stool” with “three legs.”8 This triangular relationship
is equally present in the legal sphere. This applies to the constraints that both EU membership puts on Member States’ bilateral
relations with the U.S. as well as the constraints it puts on non-EU
members that maintain various forms of close association with the
EU.
The second prong of the Article’s argument posits different
levels of difficulty that the U.S., UK and EU will face in this exercise of “transatlantic trigonometry,” which will depend on the subject matter. Ensuring continuity and crafting new forms of cooperation in the future will be easier in the “high politics” area of
security and defense than in the “low politics” of trade and regulation. This relative ease is due to the lower level of integration in
the former, which makes disentanglement and reengagement a
more straightforward task. In the latter, the trade-offs are more
readily apparent, which often make tough choices unavoidable.
In order to elaborate on these points, the Article proceeds as
follows: Section 2 briefly retraces the steps leading to the current
situation and summarizes the state of the political and scholarly
discourse. Section 3 tackles the empirical challenge of determining
the state of U.S.-EU treaty relations that will be affected by Brexit
and reveals the existence of a multitude of triangular transatlantic
relationships. Section 4 focuses on the transatlantic implications of
existing alternative modes of association with the EU, which could
serve as models—or at least points of departure—for the UK postBrexit. Turning to the way forward, Section 5 addresses the ongoing reforms within the EU, which make it a moving target, and the
“new transatlantic trigonometry” between it, the UK and the U.S.
in terms of ensuring continuity of existing treaty relationships and
setting the parameters for new agreements to be explored. Section
7
See Curtis A. Bradley, Foreign Relations Law as a Field of Study, 111 AJIL
UNBOUND 316, 320 (2017), expanded version reprinted in Curtis A. Bradley, What is
Foreign Relations Law?, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW (Curtis A. Bradley ed., forthcoming 2018) (observing how federalism and a country’s foreign relations law are increasingly recognized as playing
an important role in international affairs).
8
See DANIEL S. HAMILTON & JOSEPH P. QUINLAN, THE TRANSATLANTIC
ECONOMY 2017: ANNUAL SURVEY OF JOBS, TRADE AND INVESTMENT BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 2 (2017) (describing the UK, EU, and U.S. as three legs
of a stool given their extensive economic relationships).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss1/2

2018]

The New Transatlantic Trigonometry

7

6 summarizes the Article’s findings.
2. HOW DID WE GET HERE?
To most non-European observers, the political spectacle that is
the Brexit negotiations between the UK and the EU must seem
strange if not utterly bizarre. Hence, it is appropriate to first retrace the steps leading up to Brexit. In order to set the scene, this
Section starts in the more distant past (2.1.), then provides an overview of more recent events (2.2.), and culminates in the current
state of negotiations and academic discourse, which exhibits an increasing realization of the external relations aspects of Brexit (2.3.).
2.1. Antecedents of an Uneasy Relationship
For most of their history, the UK and the EU had an uneasy relationship. As the European Parliament’s Brexit coordinator Guy
Verhofstadt noted in April 2017: “perhaps it was never meant to
be.”9 This may hark back to Winston Churchill’s observation in
1930 that Britain was “with Europe but not of it.”10 Churchill restated this sentiment in his famous speech made in Zurich in 1946
calling for a “United States of Europe,” of which the Brits should
be “friends and sponsors”11 rather than members.
Yet, today the UK can look back on four decades of membership in the EU (and its predecessors). The UK was not a founding
member of the original integration organizations: the European
9 EUR. PARL. DEB. (RC-B8-0237) 6 (Apr. 5, 2017) (remarks of Mr. Verhofstadt),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//TEXT+CRE+20170405+ITEM006+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=en&query=INTERV&detail=3-017-000
[https://perms.cc/R7NJ-4W9X] (arguing that although Brexit was an unfortunate
outcome of domestic politics, the relationship between the UK and Europe was
always uneasy and perhaps “never meant to be”).
10
See JOHN LUKACS, CHURCHILL: VISIONARY. STATESMAN. HISTORIAN 87 (2002)
(citing Winston Churchill, SATURDAY EVENING POST, February 15, 1930) (noting
that although Churchill supported the idea of a united Europe, he considered the
UK to be somewhat apart).
11
See MARTIN GILBERT, CHURCHILL AND AMERICA 380 (2005) (citing Winston
Churchill, Speech in Zurich (September 19, 1946) (on file with BBC Written Archives Centre) (describing Churchill’s expressed support for a more united Europe).
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Coal and Steel Community, the European Atomic Energy Community, and the European Economic Community (“EEC”). It first
tried to join in 1961 under Prime Minister Macmillan, but was denied due to French opposition, in particular from President Charles
de Gaulle.12 A second attempt in 1967 under Prime Minister Wilson also failed.13 Eventually, in 1972 the Treaty of Accession was
signed, which paved the way for the UK, joined by Ireland and
Denmark, to become EEC members on January 1, 1973.14
Ever since, the UK has come to be seen as an “awkward”15 and
“reluctant partner.”16 Only two years after the UK joined the EEC,
a first referendum was held in the UK on the country’s continued
membership of the bloc. In this original “Brexit” referendum, the
“remain” camp prevailed.17 Subsequently, to name only the most
prominent sources of this awkward relationship, the UK demanded a special “rebate” in terms of its contributions to the EU’s budget,18 a permanent opt-out from the common currency,19 an opt-out
from justice and home affairs policies (though subsequently largely
retracted through opting back into specific measures),20 and re12
See ARMSTRONG, supra note 3, at 12–13 (providing the history of the UK’s
applications to join the EEC).
13
See id. at 13–14 (explaining Member States’ position on UK membership
and the reasons for opposition by France).
14 Treaty of Accession of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom, Jan. 22,
1972, 1972 O.J. (L 73) 5.
15
See generally STEPHEN GEORGE, AN AWKWARD PARTNER: BRITAIN IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (3d ed., 1998) (explaining the history and context of the
UK’s membership of the “European Communities” and how the UK, even as a
member, continued to have an awkward relationship due to various circumstances).
16
See Finn Laursen et al., The Institutional Dynamics of Euro-Atlantic Integration, in THE GEOPOLITICS OF EURO-ATLANTIC INTEGRATION 39, 44 (Anders Wivel &
Hans Mouritzen eds., 2005) (observing that the UK has not established itself as an
EU leader due to being a “reluctant partner” by opting out of several elements of
EU membership such as a common currency and Schengen cooperation).
17
See STEPHEN WALL, THE OFFICIAL HISTORY OF BRITAIN AND THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY, VOLUME II: FROM REJECTION TO REFERENDUM, 1963–1975 511–90 (2013)
(providing a history of the events leading up to and result of the UK referendum
on its European Communities membership in 1975).
18
See DAVID GOWLAND, BRITAIN AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 219–30 (2017)
(discussing the history and resolution of the controversy surrounding UK contributions to the EU budget).
19
See id. at 133–34 (describing the UK’s opting-out of various EU agreements, including the common currency).
20 See Protocol (No 21) On the Position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in
respect of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, 2016 O.J. (C 202) 295 (providing the opt-out with an option for subsequent opt-in scheme). See also STEVE

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss1/2

2018]

The New Transatlantic Trigonometry

9

fused to join the Schengen zone of passport-free travel.21
At the same time, the UK has been instrumental in the development of the EU’s internal market and saw itself as a leader of EU
(free) trade policies.22 It did not opt out of the Common Foreign
and Security Policy when it was launched with the Maastricht
Treaty of 1992, but “played a central role”23 in its development and
even became a crucial factor in breathing life into the European Security and Defence Policy (now known as the Common Security
and Defence Policy, “CSDP”) with the pivotal joint Franco-British
St. Malo Declaration of 1998.24 Hence, despite the UK’s uneasy relationship with the EU and strong Eurosceptic sentiment,25 the
EU’s external policies such as trade, but also security and defense,
tended to be less controversial, at least among the UK political
leadership.
2.2. The Brexit Referendum, Notification, and Withdrawal
The question of the UK’s continued EU membership came to a
head when Prime Minister Cameron, based on an election manifesPEERS, EU JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS LAW, VOLUME II: EU CRIMINAL LAW, POLICING,
AND CIVIL LAW 41–42 (4th ed., 2016).
21
See Protocol (No 19) On the Schengen Acquis Integrated into the Framework of the European Union, 2016 O.J. (C 202) 290 (providing the opt-out, which
applied to Ireland as well, and with which the UK maintains a common travel area).
22
See Catherine Barnard, Brexit and the EU Internal Market, in THE LAW &
POLITICS OF BREXIT 201, 201 (Federico Fabbrini ed., 2017) (noting that the “UK has
been a champion of the single market”); see also Prime Minister David Cameron,
EU
speech
at
Bloomberg
(Jan.
23,
2017),
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/eu-speech-at-bloomberg
[https://perma.cc/3K69-PB22] (“Britain is at the heart of that Single Market, and
must remain so … I want us to be at the forefront of transformative trade deals
with the US, Japan and India as part of the drive towards global free trade.”).
23
See Laursen et al., supra note 16, at 44 (“Only in the development of the
CFSP has the UK played a central role.”).
24
See Alistair J.K. Shepherd, Blair, Brown and Brussels: The European Turn in
British Defence Policy, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF BRITISH DEFENCE POLICY: BLAIR,
BROWN AND BEYOND 39, 43 (David Brown ed., 2010) (describing the drivers and
importance of the St. Malo Declaration of 1998 with respect to the UK’s integration with Europe).
25
See Chris Gifford & Karine Tournier-Sol, Introduction: The Structure of British Euroscepticism, in THE UK CHALLENGE TO EUROPEANIZATION: THE PERSISTENCE OF
BRITISH EUROSCEPTICISM 1, 1 (Karine Tournier-Sol & Chris Gifford eds., 2015) (arguing that “a powerful and persistent Euroscepticism remains entrenched in UK
political institution and public culture.”).
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to commitment,26 promised in his 2013 Bloomberg speech to hold
an in-out referendum following a renegotiation of the UK’s status
within the EU.27 The new settlement was agreed upon in February
2016. It would preserve the UK’s status of open-ended nonparticipation in the euro, provide an interpretation of the “ever
closer union”28 principle so it could not be used for expanding the
EU’s powers further, strengthen the role of national parliaments,
and bring about additional safeguards to inhibit migrants from
other EU countries from drawing social security and child benefits.29
Following a referendum campaign best described as acrimonious, alarmist, and deceiving,30 on June 23, 2016, with 17.4 million
votes in favor of leaving and 16.1 million in favor of remaining,31
“the UK had voted to leave the EU.”32 This outcome resulted in the
resignation of Cameron, who was succeeded by Theresa May after
an internal contest within the British Conservative Party.33
The question arose whether the Westminster Parliament would
need to give its consent to the government in order to deliver the
official withdrawal notification letter to the European Council,
known as “triggering” Article 50 of the Treaty on European Un26
See ARMSTRONG, supra note 3, at 42 (discussing the logic behind the Conservative Party’s making the election manifesto in terms of obtaining a positive
election result and wanted reforms to its EU membership).
27
Cameron, supra note 22. See also ARMSTRONG, supra note 3, at 25 (describing the tension in the Conservative Party over offering a referendum and David
Cameron’s ultimate “bow[ing] to pressure” to agree to it).
28
See Treaty on European Union art. 1, ¶ 2, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 1 [hereinafter
TEU] (stipulating this idea of a closer union in the thirteenth recital of the preamble as well); see also Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union, 2016 O.J. (C 202) 1 [hereinafter TFEU] (stipulating a closer union
in the first recital of the preamble).
29
See A New Settlement for the United Kingdom within the European Union, Extract of the Conclusions of the European Council of 18–19 February 2016, 2016 O.J.
(C 69) I/1 (recording the decisions made by the European Council to address the
UK’s concerns over EU membership if the UK were to vote to remain); see also
ARMSTRONG, supra note 3, at 30–35 (outlining various areas for which the UK
sought reforms with respect to its EU membership).
30 See ARMSTRONG, supra note 3, at 65–69 (describing the tensions between the
Leave and Remain campaigns, including examples of posters suggested by some
to have “incited racial hatred,” of information quality described as “post-truth,”
and of fear-mongering by both sides).
31 Id. at 69.
32 Id.
33
See id. at 141 (discussing the “leadership gap” and “policy vacuum” following the result and Cameron’s subsequent resignation).
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ion.34 In the Miller judgment of January 24, 2017, the UK Supreme
Court ruled that such consent was indeed necessary given the special nature of the EU law within the UK legal system.35 Consequently, based on a parliamentary majority, Royal Assent was given to the “European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017”
on March 16, 2017.36
On March 29, 2017, the UK government delivered the notification to the European Council.37 This started the clock for a twoyear negotiation period to conclude a withdrawal agreement before the UK would cease to be an EU member.38 It is disputed
whether the UK’s notification could be revoked unilaterally by the
British government and Brexit thus be reversed, though some legal
scholars argue that this would be permissible.39 An extension of
the two-year period provided for Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (“TEU”) is possible, but requires the unanimous decision of the European Council and the withdrawing Member State.40
Following the notification, negotiations between the UK and
the EU commenced. Based on a “sequenced” approach starting
34
See TEU, supra note 28, at art. 50, ¶ 1 (“Any Member State may decide to
withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements.”).
35 See R (on the application of Miller and another) (Respondents) v. Secretary
of State for Exiting the European Union (Appellant), [2017] UKSC 5, ¶ 101 (appeal
taken from N. Ir.) (concluding that UK parliamentary approval was required in
order to give notice to leave the EU given the terms and effect of the European
Communities Act of 1972).
36 European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017, c.9 (UK).
37 Letter from Theresa May, Prime Minister, U.K., to Donald Tusk, President,
European Council (Mar. 29, 2017).
38
See TEU, supra note 28, at art. 50, ¶ 3 (stating the EU “Treaties shall cease
to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification” to withdraw was issued, “unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period.”); see also Federico Fabbrini,
Introduction, in THE LAW & POLITICS OF BREXIT 1, 7–10 (Federico Fabbrini ed., 2017)
(discussing the details of the notification for withdrawal).
39
See, e.g., Jens Dammann, Revoking Brexit: Can Member States Rescind Their
Declaration of Withdrawal from the European Union, 23 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 265, 304
(2017) (arguing in favor of a “right to rescind” for both legal and policy reasons);
see also Aurel Sari, Reversing a Withdrawal Notification under Article 50 TEU: Can a
Member State Change Its Mind, 42 EUR. L. REV. 451 (Mar. 16, 2017) (discussing how
Article 50 notification can be revoked). In Miller, supra note 35, at ¶ 26, the UK Supreme Court refrained from ruling on this since for the parties, for the purposes of
the case, it was “common ground that notice under article 50(2) [TEU] … cannot
be given in qualified or conditional terms and that, once given, it cannot be withdrawn.”
40 TEU, supra note 28, at art. 50, ¶ 3.
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with the withdrawal agreement, the first phase of negotiations focused on the financial settlement, citizens’ rights, and the situation
in Northern Ireland. Only once these issues are addressed, negotiations shall move on to the future partnership, as insisted on by the
EU.41 In December 2017, it was declared that sufficient progress
was reached regarding the first phase,42 meaning that negotiations
could turn to a possible transitional arrangement and the future relationship. However, the issue of the border between the Republic
of Ireland and Northern Ireland, which will become part of the
EU’s external border after Brexit, remained a difficult subject in the
negotiations, and is likely to continue to cause tensions for Ireland
and the EU-UK relationship.43
In early 2018, the Council of the EU adopted additional directives regarding a transitional period, while the European Council
agreed on a set of updated negotiating guidelines.44 In midNovember 2018, the texts of a Draft Withdrawal Agreement negotiated between the European Commission and the British Government and a Political Declaration regarding the framework for the
future relationship between the EU and the UK were published.45
This was a mere four and a half months before the presumptive
deadline of March 29, 2019, after which the EU Treaties would
“cease to apply”46 to the UK. However, these are not the only treaties to be affected by Brexit.

41
Special meeting of the European Council (Art. 50) (29 April 2017), EUCO
XT 20004/17.
42 European Council (Art. 50) meeting (15 Dec. 2017), EUCO XT 20011/17.
43
See John Doyle and Eileen Connolly, Brexit and the Northern Ireland Question, in THE LAW & POLITICS OF BREXIT 140 (Federico Fabbrini ed., 2017) (analyzing
the political impact of different outcomes of the Brexit negotiations on Northern
Ireland, including those of a ‘hard border’ on the island of Ireland and the alternative of a border between Ireland and the UK running through the Irish Sea).
44
Council of the European Union (29 Jan. 2018), Supplementary Directives
for the Negotiation of an Agreement with the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland Setting out the Arrangements for its Withdrawal from the
European Union, XT 21004/18 ADD 1 REV 2; European Council (Art. 50) (23 Mar.
2018), EUCO XT 20001/18.
45 Draft Agreement on the Withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, as agreed at negotiators’ level, TF50 55, Nov. 14, 2018; Political
Declaration Setting out the Framework for the Future Relationship between the
European Union and the United Kingdom (22 Nov. 2018).
46 TEU, supra note 28, at art. 50, ¶ 3.
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2.3. Academic Discourse and the External Dimension
In the academic discourse, it has been increasingly recognized
that Brexit has “two faces”, one internal and one external.47 In other words, it entails questions of both EU and national law on the
one side,48 and international law, on the other.49 According to Article 50 TEU, the arrangements to be made with the departing country are to take “account of the framework for its future relationship
with the Union.”50 Therefore, the external dimension of Brexit already loomed large even before the EU concluded that there had
been “sufficient progress” in its negotiations with the UK so as to
move to negotiating a future trade and other agreements with the
EU. However, the international legal dimension goes far beyond
the future EU-UK relationship. According to research conducted
by the Financial Times, the UK’s withdrawal from the EU will require the renegotiation of more than 750 international agreements
with 168 different countries, from which the UK currently benefits
by virtue of being an EU member.51
Moreover, when approaching Brexit from a transatlantic angle,
U.S. foreign relations law needs to be added to the considered legal
frameworks. After all, neither a future U.S.-UK trade deal nor a
revamped Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)52
with the EU will ever see the light of day if either fails to secure the
approval by the relevant constitutional branches under the U.S.
Constitution. This concerns, in particular, certain majorities in
Congress, depending on the content of the agreement.53 Hence,
47 Adam Łazowski & Ramses A. Wessel, The External Dimension of Withdrawal
from the European Union, REVUE DES AFFAIRES EUROPÉENNES 623 (Apr. 2016).
48 See Adam Łazowski, Withdrawal from the European Union and Alternatives to
Membership, 37 EUR. L. REV. 523 (2012) (discussing how high levels of legal integration within the EU make it difficult to withdraw from the EU). The British legal
dimension was expounded in Miller, supra note 35.
49
Jed Odermatt, Brexit and International Law: Disentangling Legal Orders, 31
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1051, 1054 (2017).
50 TEU, supra note 28, at art. 50, ¶ 2.
51 Paul McClean, After Brexit: the UK will need to renegotiate at least 759 treaties,
FIN. TIMES (May 30, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/f1435a83-372b-11e7bce4-9023f8c0fd2e [https://perma.cc/5NZU-TAM9].
52 The negotiations on TTIP have been discontinued since the end of 2016, see
Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, U.S.-EU Joint Report on TTIP: Progress to Date, (Jan. 17, 2017) (noting that “[b]etween July 2013 and October 2016, 15 Negotiating Rounds were held”, but not outlining any specific future
steps).
53
A two-thirds Senate majority will be needed if concluded as a “treaty”
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Brexit’s external face is an inherently multilevel problem, involving
national (including from non-EU members), EU, and international
law.
The transatlantic relationship should take pride of place in researching the external dimension of Brexit for both economic and
political reasons. According to the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, the “United States and the 28 Member States of the EU
share the largest economic relationship in the world.”54 Moreover,
the wider strategic importance of transatlantic bonds and shared
values needs to be stressed.55 In legal-academic circles, compelling
cases have been made for a transatlantic perspective or vision.56 In
this spirit, the present Article adopts a distinctly transatlantic focus
on the external dimension of Brexit.
Before delving into the empirical, legal, and political challenges
that Brexit poses for transatlantic treaty relations, a preliminary
point on the EU as an international actor should be made, especially in view of this Article’s emphasis on trade and security as substantive focus areas. This focus is not to imply that other policy areas, such as environmental protection, are not important. Trade
and security serve as illustrations of what traditionally have been
seen as respectively “low” and “high politics.”57 Moreover, they
(U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2), or a simple majority in both Houses if concluded as a
“congressional-executive agreement,” covering matters falling under the enumerated powers of either the President or Congress (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, and art. II,
§ 2, respectively). See also Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and
Future of International Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1274–1306
(2008) (summarizing the practice of both modes of treaty making).
54 U.S. OFFICE OF THE TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2017 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE
REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 139 (Mar. 2017); see also HAMILTON &
QUINLAN, supra note 8, at v (“Despite transatlantic political turbulence, the U.S.
and Europe remain each other’s most important markets.”).
55
Cf. SHARED VISION, COMMON ACTION: A STRONGER EUROPE, A GLOBAL
STRATEGY FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION’S FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY 36 (June 2016)
(stating that “a solid transatlantic partnership through NATO and with the United
States and Canada helps us strengthen resilience, address conflicts, and contribute
to effective global governance.”); and NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 47 (Dec. 2017) (stating that “a strong and free Europe is of vital
importance to the United States. We are bound together by our shared commitment to the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.”).
56
A TRANSATLANTIC COMMUNITY OF LAW: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EU AND US LEGAL ORDERS (Elaine Fahey & Deirdre
Curtin eds., 2014); and LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN THE ATLANTIC AREA (Eric Stein &
Peter Hay eds., 1967).
57
For this distinction, see generally Stanley Hoffman, Obstinate or Obsolete?
The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe, 95 DAEDALUS (1966) (arguing that while European states were more willing to integrate in areas of “low
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correspond to the two distinct modes of operation in EU foreign
policy.
On the one hand, this concerns EU trade policy (called the
“Common Commercial Policy”, CCP),58 which is decidedly supranational.59 This supranational mode of operation is also the default
of rules and decision-making procedures in the EU and is characterized by the prominent roles played by the European Commission and the European Parliament,60 voting by “qualified majority”
in the Council of the EU,61 according to which a minority of Member States can be outvoted, and jurisdiction of the Court of Justice
of the EU (CJEU).62
On the other hand, this concerns the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which is decidedly intergovernmental.63 It
represents a delimited policy field with its own “specific rules and
procedures.”64 The latter is designed to sideline the supranational
institutions and guarantee that the Member States remain free to
act internationally.65 Other external policies fall between this spectrum of “bipolarity.”66 As a matter of foreign relations law, i.e.,
understanding how the EU operates internally when engaging the
politics” such as trade, in the “high politics” of foreign and security policy they
carefully guarded their national sovereignty); see also Stanley Hoffman, Reflections
on the Nation-State in Western Europe Today, 21 J. COMMON MKT. ST. 21, 29 (1982)
(acknowledging the difficulty to clearly delimiting “low” and “high” politics and
proposing instead a distinction between politics of “strict reciprocity” and politics
which aims “for the maximization of the common good”).
58 TFEU, supra note 28, at art. 207, ¶ 1.
59
GABRIEL SILES-BRÜGGE, CONSTRUCTING EUROPEAN UNION TRADE POLICY: A
GLOBAL IDEA OF EUROPE 9 (2014).
60 TFEU, supra note 28, at art. 294 (detailing what is now known as the “ordinary legislative procedure”).
61 Id., art. 238, ¶ 3 (defining a qualified majority).
62 See id., at art. 263 (on review powers in actions for annulment of legislative
and certain other acts) and id., arts. 258–60 (on infringements proceedings against
the Member States).
63
STEPHAN KEUKELEIRE & TOM DELREUX, THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION 63 (2d ed. 2014).
64 TEU, supra note 28, at art 24, ¶ 1.
65
KEUKELEIRE & DELREUX, supra note 63, at 72 (noting that “the Commission
is largely sidelined in the CFSP and CSDP”).
66
Alan Dashwood, The Continuing Bipolarity of EU External Action, in THE
EUROPEAN UNION IN THE WORLD: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF MARC MARESCEAU 3, 3 (Inge
Govaere et al. eds., 2014). For instance, the EU’s development policy does not
have its own “specific rules and procedures.” However, the EU Treaties make
clear that the Member States retain their own national development policies.
TFEU, supra note 28, at art. 4, ¶ 4.
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world in general and the United States in particular,67 it is crucial
to keep the existence of these different modes in mind, something
that is rather alien to the American system of foreign relations
law.68 From an American legal perspective, the CFSP might be best
explained as an additional layer of “exceptionalism” within the
general exceptionalism pertaining to foreign relations.69 This distinction is crucial for the second prong of the Article’s argument:
resolving Brexit and piecing back together the transatlantic triangle
will be easier in the area of “high politics” of sovereignty-sensitive
areas such as security and defense than in the allegedly “low politics” of trade and regulation, due not in the least to its intergovernmental character and lack of deep integration.
3. PRE-BREXIT AND THE TWENTY-EIGHT TRANSATLANTIC TRIANGLES
Political discourse likes to simplify transatlantic relations
through the use of binary imagery. Prominent examples of this include the idea of the “two pillars,”70 a “transatlantic bargain” of
providing security in exchange for economic integration,71 “the
sword and shield”,72 or a phone line with America on one end and
67 Bradley, supra note 7, at 316 n.1 (noting that the “European Union, as a supranational institution that in some ways resembles a nation, also has a developed
body of foreign relations law.”); see also Joris Larik, EU Foreign Relations Law as a
Field of Scholarship, 111 AJIL UNBOUND 321 (2017) (discussing the development of
EU foreign relations law and predicting that it will become a “pillar and important driver” of foreign relations legal scholarship).
68
While different degrees of deference apply to different contexts, no radically different sets of constitutional rules and procedures apply depending on the
policy area; see Curtis A. Bradley, Foreign Relations Law and the Purported Shift
Away From “Exceptionalism”, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 294, 300 (2015) (examining the
degrees of deference given by the U.S. Supreme Court to the Bush Administration’s interpretation of treaties).
69 Curtis A. Bradley, A New American Foreign Affairs Law?, 70 U. COLO. L. REV.
1089, 1096 (1999) (describing exceptionalism as “the view that the federal government’s foreign affairs powers are subject to a different, and generally more relaxed, set of constitutional restraints than those that govern its domestic powers”).
70
See Joris Larik, Kennedy’s “Two Pillars” Revisited: Does the ESDP Make the
EU and the USA Equal Partners in NATO?, 14 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 289, 290–91
(2009) (describing the EU and the U.S. as the “two pillars” of NATO).
71
STANLEY R. SLOAN, NATO, THE EUROPEAN UNION, AND THE ATLANTIC
COMMUNITY: THE TRANSATLANTIC BARGAIN CHALLENGED 1 (2d ed., 2005).
72
The “shield” denotes European conventional forces deployed against the
Warsaw Pact, while the “sword” represents U.S. nuclear forces. See Kori N.
Schake, NATO Strategy and the German-American Relationship, in THE UNITED STATES
AND GERMANY IN THE ERA OF THE COLD WAR, 1945–1990, A HANDBOOK, VOLUME I:
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Europe on the other end.73 In reality, however, these relationships
are more complex. Legally speaking, the relations that the United
States entertains with the EU and its Member States can be best
understood as a set of triangles, hence making transatlantic relations and their recalibration due to Brexit an exercise of legal ‘trigonometry.’
To visualize these triangles, one could imagine the following:
one line connects Washington, D.C., and Brussels, the “capital” of
the European Union where most of its key organs are situated.
This line represents the bilateral relations between the U.S. and the
EU as a legal person. Moreover, 28 lines extend from Washington,
D.C., into each of the EU Member States’ capitals, representing the
legal relationships between the U.S. and the Member States as sovereign entities. In addition, 28 lines extend from Brussels to each
Member State capital.74 These signify that the EU Member States
have pooled important and extensive powers at the EU level,75
which affects their ability to act on the international plane.76 This
latter aspect constitutes a special link since it is not one governed
by public international law but by EU law, which enjoys “primacy”
over national law (what American lawyers may call “supremacy”)
and under certain circumstances can be directly invoked by individuals and enforced by Member State courts (what EU lawyers
call “direct effect”)—those being the hallmarks of the EU as a supranational legal order distinct from both international and national law.77
1945–1968 233, 236 (Detlef Junker ed., 2011) (discussing the sometimes uneasy relationship between European and U.S. approaches to defense during the Cold
War).
73
David Brunnstrom, EU Says it has Solved the Kissinger Question, REUTERS
(Nov. 20, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-president-kissingeridUSTRE5AJ00B20091120 [https://perma.cc/YA5W-8AV8].
74
Geometrically speaking, in the case of Belgium it would be a very flat triangle given that two of its points are located in Brussels, being the capital of Belgium and the seat of most of the EU’s main institutions.
75
For the EU’s catalogue of powers (“competences”), see TFEU, supra note
28, at arts. 3–6 (establishing the different types of European Union competence for
different policy areas).
76 For a detailed analysis, see Marise Cremona, External Relations and External
Competence of the European Union: The Emergence of an Integrated Policy, in THE
EVOLUTION OF EU LAW 217 (Paul Craig & Gráinne de Búrca eds., 2d ed., 2011) (examining the development of the European Union and the relationship between its
internal and external dimensions).
77
As noted by the CJEU in Opinion 1/91 (EEA), 1991 E.C.R. I-06079, ¶ 21
(“In contrast, the EEC Treaty, albeit concluded in the form of an international
agreement, none the less constitutes the constitutional charter of a Community
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These different legal triangles are the basic ingredients of the
transatlantic legal relationship. It is important to recognize that
even when a relationship looks one-dimensional on the surface, it
is nonetheless triangular. For instance, a bilateral treaty between
Ireland and the U.S. has to take into account Ireland’s obligations
as an EU Member State. Vice versa, a bilateral agreement between
the U.S. and the EU will have to conform to the division of competences between the Union and Member States and will need to respect the “constitutional” identity of the Member States as a core
constitutional principle of EU law.78 Lastly, “mixed” relationships
are more obviously triangular, since this concerns agreements that
involve both the EU and the Member States as parties. Such
“mixed agreements” are concluded between a third party “of the
one part,” and the EU and its Member States “of the other.”79
Hence, these agreements are not among the Member States or between the Member States and the EU. Instead, these relationships
remain governed by EU law, in which international agreements
rank below the EU Treaties, considered by the Court of Justice of
the EU as the Union’s “constitutional charter.”80 In addition, there
are multilateral settings in which both the U.S. and the EU and/or
its Member States are present. These also create transatlantic legal
triangles, albeit as part of a wider and denser web of international
legal relationships.
The following three sub-sections present these different relabased on the rule of law … The essential characteristics of the Community legal
order which has thus been established are in particular its primacy over the law of
the Member States and the direct effect of a whole series of provisions which are
applicable to their nationals and to the Member States themselves.”). See also
Joined Cases C-402/05 P & 415/05 P, Kadi & Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council
& Comm’n, 2008 E.C.R. I-06351, ¶ 285 [hereinafter Kadi v. Council] (“[T]he obligations imposed by an international agreement cannot have the effect of prejudicing
the constitutional principles of the EC Treaty …”). For a critique that likens the
EU to the U.S. in its approach to the rank of international law within the domestic
legal order, see Gráinne de Búrca, The European Court of Justice and the International
Legal Order After Kadi, 51 HARV. INT’L L. REV. 1, 49 (2010) (examining the response
of European courts to the U.N. Security Council’s anti-terrorist sanctions regime).
78
TEU, supra note 28, at art. 4, ¶ 2. See Armin von Bogdandy & Stephan
Schill, Overcoming Absolute Primacy: Respect for National Identity under the Lisbon
Treaty, 48 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1417 (2011) (proposing that article 4, paragraph 2,
of the Treaty on European Union strengthens Member States’ constitutional identity against EU law).
79
See, e.g., Agreement on the Promotion, Provision and Use of Galileo and
GPS Satellite-Based Navigation Systems and Related Applications, pmbl., June 26,
2004, U.N.T.S. 52728.
80 Kadi v. Council, supra note 77, at ¶ 281.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss1/2

2018]

The New Transatlantic Trigonometry

19

tionships as they stand pre-Brexit with data on the status of treaty
relations as of August 14, 2018. As a preliminary matter, the methodology for establishing the current extent of treaty relations between the EU and U.S. is explained, which is an exercise less
straightforward than one might expect (3.1.). Subsequently, the
content of these treaty relations is outlined from the EU’s perspective (3.2.), as well as from the Member States’ perspective (3.3.).
They serve as the basis—the status quo ante Brexit, if you will—that
provides the base line for what needs to be recalibrated.
3.1. The Trouble of Counting Treaties
A logical way to begin a discussion of transatlantic treaty relations would be to state the number of agreements actually in force
between the EU and U.S., and which the UK will cease to be covered by post-Brexit. However, this number remains far from clear
due to discrepancies in official and authoritative accounts. This
empirical challenge, hence, merits some preliminary observations
on how to identify the relevant treaties.
In order to determine more precisely the EU-U.S. relationship,
three authoritative sources exist, i.e., the U.S. State Department’s Treaties in Force 2018,81 the EU’s Treaty Office Database,82
and the Brexit treaty renegotiation checklist compiled by the Financial
Times.83 A closer look at them reveals that their numbers do not
match up. Hence, there is not even a consensus as to the number
of treaties between the U.S. and EU in force, which is an important
preliminary for delving into the recalibration of relations prompted
by Brexit.
In terms of bilateral treaties, the U.S. State Department lists 32
agreements in force between the EU and U.S.84 According to the
81
U.S. Dep’t of St., Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and Other International
Agreements of the United States in Force on January 1, 2018, (January 1, 2018)
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/282222.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S29S-YBXC] (last visited Aug. 15, 2018).
82
Eur. External Action Serv., EU Treaty Office Database,
http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/default.home.do
[https://perma.cc/9G9Q-BV2Q] (last updated Sept. 3, 2018).
83
Paul McClean et al., The Brexit Treaty Renegotiation Checklist, FIN. TIMES
(Aug.
20,
2017),
https://ig.ft.com/brexit-treaty-database/
[https://perma.cc/HA8Y-MSD2].
84 See U.S. Dep’t of St., supra note 81, at 146–47 (referring to entries under the
heading “European Union”, and not the European Atomic Energy Community
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EU’s Treaty Office Database, the number is 54,85 and according to
the FT, it is 37.86 This excludes treaties pending ratification or
those which are being provisionally applied, as well as the many
administrative agreements concluded directly between U.S. and
EU agencies.87
Three main reasons for this divergence can be identified: timing, consolidation (counting extensions and amendments), and inclusion of different sets of “soft” agreements. While the first two
are methodological differences, the third one seems arbitrary from
a legal point of view.
In terms of timing, Treaties in Force lists all treaties the U.S. considers to be in force at a particular point in time. In the current edition, this is January 1, 2018. Consequently, the U.S. list does not include agreements that entered into force after that date.88 Hence,
the Bilateral Agreement between the European Union and the
United States of America on Prudential Measures Regarding Insurance and Reinsurance, which entered into force on April 4,
2018, is absent from the 2018 version of Treaties in Force. In addition, the latter source includes only those treaties that “had not expired by their own terms, been denounced by the parties, replaced
or superseded by other agreements, or otherwise definitely terminated” by that date.89 By contrast, the EU Treaty Office lists all
agreements that entered into force at some point in the past, including those that are no longer in force. This concerns six agreements of the 54 listed by the EU, including the 2004 Agreement on
the processing and transfer of passenger name records data by air
carriers,90 which was declared incompatible with the EU Treaties
(Euratom) or any of the Union’s agencies, which are listed separately).
85
Id. Using as search parameters “Bilateral,” “Entered into Force,” and
“United States” in its “Advanced Search” mode.
86 McClean et. al, supra note 83.
87
See Peter Chase & Jacques Pelkmans, This Time it’s Different: TurboCharging Regulatory Cooperation, in RULE-MAKERS OR RULE-TAKERS: EXPLORING THE
TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP 17, 55–60 (Daniel Hamilton &
Jacques Pelkmans eds., 2015) (overviewing such agreements in a useful tabular
form).
88 U.S. Dep’t of St., supra note 81, at i.
89 Id.
90
See Council Decision 2004/496 of May 28, 2004 on the conclusion of an
Agreement between the European Community and the United States of America
on the processing and transfer of PNR data by air carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, 2004
O.J. (L 183) 83 (including the text of the 2004 Agreement).
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by the CJEU for fundamental rights concerns (privacy),91 subsequently denounced by the Council,92 and ultimately replaced by an
agreement from 2011, which entered into force in 2012.93
Regarding consolidation, the U.S. and EU employ different approaches to counting extensions and amendments of pre-existing
agreements. The State Department opts for a more “economical”
approach by listing the main agreement, and then mentioning
amendments and extensions as additional information as part of
that same entry. The EU Treaty Office Database, on its part, counts
amendments and extensions as separate agreements. For example,
the EU-U.S. Agreement for scientific and technological cooperation
from 1997, which was renewed in 2004 and renewed and amended
in 2009, is counted as one by the Americans and as three by the Europeans.94 From the point of view of the international law of treaties the latter approach is technically correct.95 However, from a
treaty negotiator’s perspective, it might be more useful to adhere to
the U.S. approach of counting the consolidated, up-to-date versions of the agreements currently in force.
Thirdly, the most important difference in terms of numbers relates to the counting of “softer” agreements, such as exchanges of
letters and memoranda of understanding. However, there is no
clearly discernible difference in approach, for instance with one
91
Joined Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04, Parliament v. Council & Comm’n,
2006 E.C.R. I-04721.
92
Council Communication Notice concerning the denunciation of the
Agreement between the European Community and the United States of America
on the processing and transfer of PNR data by air carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, 2006
O.J. (C 219) 1.
93 Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union
on the use and transfer of passenger name records to the United States Department of Homeland Security, EU-U.S., Dec. 14, 2011, T.I.A.S. 12-701.
94 U.S. Dep’t of St., supra note 81, at 147.
95
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 39, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT] (“A treaty may be amended by agreement between the parties. The rules laid down in Part II [on conclusion and entry into
force of treaties] apply to such an agreement except insofar as the treaty may otherwise provide.”). The United States has signed but not ratified the VCLT. But see
Curtis A. Bradley, Unratified Treaties, Domestic Politics, and the U.S. Constitution, 48
HARV. INT’L L. REV. 307, 314 (2007) (noting that nevertheless, “executive branch
officials have stated on a number of occasions that they view much of the Convention as reflecting binding customary international law,” with further references).
See also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations, art. 39, ¶ 1, Mar. 21,
1986 [hereinafter VCLTIO] (containing a similar provision to the VCLT, though
not in force).
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side being generally more generous and the other more restrictive
in terms of what it considers worthy of being included in their respective lists. According to the preface of Treaties in Force, it “uses
the term ‘treaty’ in the generic sense as defined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,” rather than “as a matter of U.S.
Hence, executive and executiveconstitutional law”.96
congressional agreements are not excluded from the U.S. compendium on “treaties”—despite its name.
Beyond that, it is not evident which criteria are applied by either side. For instance, the EU lists an exchange of letters from
2005 relating to the method of calculation of applied duties for
husked rice,97 while the U.S. does not. By contrast, the U.S. includes a memorandum of understanding from 2009 on the importation of beef from animals not treated with certain growthpromoting hormones,98 while the EU does not. Each side includes
a number of such “soft” agreements in its list that the other does
not, with no legal-methodological reason readily apparent.
Regarding the list compiled by the Financial Times, which includes 37 U.S.-EU bilateral agreements, in addition to the issues
mentioned above, some additional observations need to be made.
While excluding expired and superseded treaties, it also excludes
those that the journalists and researchers from the Financial Times
considered of “little or no relevance to the UK after Brexit,” 99 while
including also eight European Commission implementing decisions and two delegated regulations.100 The authors justify this by
96
U.S. Dep’t of St., supra note 81, at i. The VCLT defines treaties as “an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by
international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation.” VCLT, supra note 95,
at art. 2, ¶ 1, lit. a. The VCLTIO defines it as “an international agreement governed by international law and concluded in written form: (i) between one or
more States and one or more international organizations; or (ii) between international organizations.” VCLTIO, supra note 95, at art. 2, ¶ 1, lit. a.
97
Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters between the European
Community and the United States of America relating to the method of calculation of applied duties for husked rice, June 30, 2005.
98
Memorandum of understanding regarding the importation of beef from
animals not treated with certain growth-promoting hormones and increased duties applied by the United States to certain products of the European Communities, May 13, 2009, T.I.A.S. 09–513; U.S. Dep’t of St., supra note 81, at 139.
99
McClean et. al., supra note 83.
100 Id.; See, e.g. Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/230 of 17 Feb.
2016 (amending Implementing Decision 2014/908/EU as regards the lists of third
countries and territories whose supervisory and regulatory requirements are considered equivalent for the purposes of the treatment of exposures according to
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noting that these are “EU ‘equivalence’ decisions on financial services, which provide access rights to third countries” and that
“[t]rade partners would likely take them as a starting point in financial services discussions with the UK after Brexit.”101 While
these are indeed relevant acts in the transatlantic and Brexit contexts, they are unilateral in nature and not international agreements.
If one were to approximate the correct number of bilateral treaties currently in force between the EU and U.S. by combining these
different lists and with regard to their legal content, it would be
around fifty. This number takes into account only bilateral agreements which are currently in force, in their “consolidated” versions, and which despite their sometimes “soft” format at least one
side deems “hard” enough to include in their list. This set of
agreements represents the substantive treaty law in force between
the EU and U.S. bilaterally, which will cease to apply to the UK after Brexit and should be the subject of official discussion to ensure
continuity and serve as the baseline for exploring future agreements. Whether all of them need to be replicated, or whether the
terms of the replacement treaties should change, will be a matter of
negotiations and internal political considerations framed by domestic foreign relations law.
A discrepancy exists also when it comes to multilateral treaties.
The EU Treaty Office Database lists 80 multilateral agreements that
have entered into force for the EU and which the U.S. has at least
signed, if not ratified.102 The Financial Times only lists seven multilateral treaties to be renegotiated with the U.S., noting that in cases
such as the WTO or UN, “the UK should be able to ‘plug in’ to
these agreements with ease.”103 This is again a political assessment
and not a legal one. The State Department’s Treaties in Force, does
not allow for a direct two-way comparison, as it simply lists all
multilateral treaties in force for the U.S. on January 1, 2018, ordered
according to subject matter but without specifying treaty parties.104
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council,
2016 O.J. (L 41) 23).
101 McClean et. al., supra note 83.
102
These numbers are taken from the European External Action Service, supra note 82, using the markers “Multilateral”, “United States”, and “Entered into
Force” in the “Advanced Search” form.
103 McClean et. al., supra note 83.
104
U.S. Dep’t of St., supra note 81, at 497–555 (“Section 2: Multilateral Treaties and Other Agreements”).
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Not all of the 80 multilateral agreements from the EU’s database
that also include the U.S. are listed in Treaties in Force. In addition
to the reasons for discrepancy mentioned in the bilateral context,
another factor at play here is that the EU database includes the signatories to multilateral treaties rather than only those that have ratified. This means that the EU’s list includes treaties that the U.S.
has signed but not ratified.105 At the same time the EU Treaty Office Database excludes most of the WTO Agreements, to which the
U.S. is a party, from a targeted search.106
In sum, there is already a significant degree of uncertainty regarding the scope of what the international treaty law in force is
between the EU and U.S. in the lead-up to the UK’s withdrawal
from the EU. Consequently, this means also significant uncertainty
as to the extent of what might need to be renegotiated post-Brexit
at the empirical stage, before even getting to the legal and political
dimension of this challenge.
3.2. The EU-U.S. Relationship
Having outlined the empirical difficulties in establishing the
number of treaties in force between the EU and U.S., the following
paragraphs provide a categorization of different kinds of transatlantic treaties based on the parties involved, which also reveals the
extent of their substance. Starting with EU-U.S. agreements, the
analysis subsequently addresses the issue of agreements between
the U.S. and EU Member States.
Both within bilateral and multilateral treaties, one must distinguish between “mixed” and “non-mixed” treaties, i.e., those where
in addition to the EU, its Member States are also parties, and those
105 See generally World Health Org. Framework Convention on Tobacco Control,
(May
21,
2003),
http://www.who.int/tobacco/framework/WHO_FCTC_english.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2SZW-R7MM]; Conference on Plenipotentiaries, Rotterdam
Convention on the prior informed consent procedure for certain hazardous chemicals and pesticides in international trade, Sept. 11, 1998 U.N.T.C. 39973.
106
Using the European External Action Service data and search parameters
from supra note 102, for instance, neither the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, signed in Marrakesh, Apr. 15, 1994, nor the plurilateral Agreement on Government Procurement, signed in Marrakesh, Apr. 15,
1994, are listed. They appear, however, when only the markers “Multilateral” and
“Entered into Force”, but not “United States” are used, even though the latter has
ratified both agreements.
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where only the EU is a party but not the Member States. In contrast to general EU practice,107 “mixity” tends to be rare in its bilateral treaty relations that do not include a wide-ranging agreement
involving sensitive issues, especially those falling out of the EU’s
ambit of “exclusive competences”. A prime example of such a
mixed agreement is the Comprehensive Economic and Trade
Agreement (CETA) between the EU and Canada.108 With regard to
the U.S., such an agreement would have been TTIP.109
Nonetheless, the EU has concluded with the U.S. a number of
sectoral agreements in different fields. If the EU has sufficient
powers and the issues concerned are not viewed as highly sensitive
by the Member States, they can agree to conclude them as EU-only
(“non-mixed”) agreements.110 This is—perhaps counterintuitively—also the case for agreements in security and defense matters
falling under the CFSP. Despite their “high politics” nature, if
there is consensus among the Member States, such agreements are
concluded by the EU alone with a third party.111 The U.S. is no exception in that respect. In U.S. foreign relations law, by contrast,
‘mixity’ does not occur, despite the states’ constitutionally granted—though limited—powers to make “agreements” with “foreign
powers.”112
107
Christophe Hillion & Panos Koutrakos, Introduction, in MIXED
AGREEMENTS REVISITED: THE EU AND ITS MEMBER STATES IN THE WORLD xix, xix
(Christophe Hillion & Panos Koutrakos eds., 2010) (“The phenomenon of mixity is
still central to the conduct of EU external relations.”).
108
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of the one part, and the European Union and its Member States, of the other
part, EU-Can., Oct. 30, 2016, 2017 O.J. (L 11) 23 [hereinafter CETA].
109
FERDI DE VILLE & GABRIEL SILES-BRÜGGE, TTIP: THE TRUTH ABOUT THE
TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP 7 (2016).
110
See Case C-600/14, Federal Republic of Germany v. Council (COTIF),
ECLI:EU:C:2017:935, ¶¶ 67–68 (clarifying the EU’s ability to conclude international agreements without the Member States as parties); see also Marise Cremona,
Shaping EU Trade Policy post-Lisbon: Opinion 2/15 of 16 May 2017, 14 EUR. CONST’L L.
REV. 231, 251 (2018).
111 Guillaume Van der Loo & Ramses A. Wessel, The Non-Ratification of Mixed
Agreements: Legal Consequences and Solutions, 54 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 735, 739
(2017) (“Perhaps ironically, an area which is not at all characterized by mixity is
the Common Foreign, Security and Defence Policy …”).
112
Cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (“No State shall, without the Consent of
Congress, … enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a
foreign Power, …”) with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall enter into
any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation …”). See Robert Schütze, Federalism and
Foreign Affairs: Mixity as an (Inter)national Phenomenon, in MIXED AGREEMENTS
REVISITED: THE EU AND ITS MEMBER STATES IN THE WORLD 57, 62–65 (Christophe Hillion & Panos Koutrakos eds., 2010) (summarizing the history of U.S. constitutional
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The U.S. obviously is an important treaty partner for the EU,
but not the largest in terms of absolute numbers. Based on numbers provided by the EU Treaty Office Database (though their exact
numbers are to be taken with a grain of salt as explained, supra
3.1.), the EU has signed 147 agreements with the U.S.113 With Switzerland, this number is 206; with Norway, it is 182.114 Thirteen of
the 147 agreements between the U.S. and EU have not entered into
force yet.115 About fifty of these are bilateral and currently in force
in their consolidated versions, while approximately sixty to eighty
multilateral ones are in force.116
3.2.1. Bilateral
The bilateral agreements in force between the EU and U.S. cover a wide range of sectors, including the areas of trade and security. In the former area, the EU and U.S. have not managed to conclude a comprehensive agreement. The negotiations on TTIP,
launched in 2013,117 have stalled and remain on hold. Hence, trade
relations between the U.S. and EU are largely covered by WTO
rules (see infra 3.1.2.). Nonetheless, there are a number of sectoral
or specific agreements in the area of trade between the two parties.
These are in the areas of, among others, competition118 or trade in
hormone-treated beef as the result of a long-lasting WTO dispute.119 Some are of a technical character, such as the Agreement
law with regard to constraining the external treaty-making powers of the States);
see also IVAN BERNIER, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ASPECTS OF FEDERALISM 51 (1973) (noting that the “states of the American Union are not presently subjects of international law.”).
113
These numbers are taken from the European External Action Service, supra note 82, using the markers “Bilateral” and “Multilateral,” as well as “Entered
into Force” and “Pending” in the “Advanced Search” form.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117
See DE VILLE & SILES-BRÜGGE, supra note 109, at 8–9 (summarizing the negotiation process).
118
See U.S.-EU, June 3–4, 1998, T.I.A.S. No. 12958 (agreeing on the application of positive comity principles in the enforcement of their competition laws).
119 See Memorandum of Understanding between the United States of America and the European Commission Regarding the Importation of Beef from Animals Not Treated with Certain Growth-Promoting Hormones and Increased Duties Applied by the United States to Certain Products of the European
Communities, U.S.-EU, May 13, 2009, T.I.A.S. No. 09-513.
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on Mutual Recognition of 1998.120 The importance of such agreements in the contemporary economy is not to be underestimated,
as they “are immensely important for oiling the wheels of trade”121
and avoiding delays and duplication in processes where possible.
However, the U.S.-EU bilateral treaty relationship also extends
into the area of security. This policy domain can be further subdivided into, on the one hand, international security, including sanctions and operations abroad, and, on the other, homeland security,
including cooperation between law enforcement agencies.
In the latter area, the U.S. and the EU have engaged in treaties
concerning, for instance, the exchange of passenger name records122 or on financial data to combat terrorist financing.123 Moreover, there are agreements on extradition and mutual legal assistance,124 as well as cooperation agreements concluded with EU
agencies that operate in this field, such as Europol.125 An agree120
See Agreement on Mutual Recognition between the European Community and the United States of America, EU-U.S., May 18, 1998, E.T.S. No. 31 (setting
out various specific standards to which both the U.S. and European Community
will conform in order to facilitate trade).
121
Marise Cremona, UK Trade Policy, in THE UK AFTER BREXIT: LEGAL AND
POLICY CHALLENGES 247, 259 (Michael Dougan ed., 2017).
122
Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on the Use and Transfer of Passenger Name Records to the United States Department of Homeland Security, U.S.-EU, Dec. 14, 2011, T.I.A.S. No. 12-701.
123
Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on the Processing and Transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the European Union to the United States for the Purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking
Program, U.S.-EU, June 28, 2010, T.I.A.S. No. 10-801. The UK, given its opt-out
from this area of EU policy (supra 2.1), opted back into this specific agreement. See
Council Decision on the Conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the Processing and Transfer of Financial
Messaging Data from the European Union to the United States for purposes of the
Terrorist Finance Tracking Program, 2010 O.J. (L 195) 3 [herein after TFTP] (noting
in the preamble that “the United Kingdom has notified its wish to take part in the
adoption and application of this Decision.”).
124 See Agreement on Extradition between the European Union and the United States of America, EU-U.S., pmbl., June 25, 2003, T.I.A.S. 10-201 (setting forth
that the parties desire to cooperate on extradition in order to “combat crime in a
more effective way as a means of protecting their respective democratic societies
and common values”); see also Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance between
the United States of America and the European Union, U.S.-E.U., June 25, 2003,
T.I.A.S. 10-201.1 (outlining various ways in which the parties will share information or provide assistance for criminal prosecutions and investigations).
125
See Agreement to Enhance Cooperation in Preventing, Detecting, Suppressing, and Investigating Serious Forms of International Crime, EU-U.S., art. 1,
Dec. 6, 2001, T.I.A.S. 01-1207 (setting forth that the EU, through Europol, and the
U.S. will cooperate with respect to combating international crime by exchanging
“strategic and technical information”). Note that this agreement is not listed by
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ment which straddles the areas of internal and external security is
about the treatment of classified information, concluded between
the U.S. and EU in 2007.126 From the EU’s point of view, it has its
“legal basis” in both the Common Foreign and Security Policy and
the Area of Freedom Security and Justice.127
While the U.S. and EU have not managed to strike a deep and
comprehensive agreement in the area of “low politics” trade, they
did conclude a number of agreements in the area of security and
defense—an area in which the EU’s “economic giant” tends to be
contrasted with its being a “political dwarf” and “military
worm.”128 As noted earlier, these agreements in the area of the
EU’s CFSP are non-mixed, i.e., they do not include the Member
States as parties.129
For instance, in 2016, the U.S. and EU concluded an Acquisition
and Cross-servicing Agreement, which has as its objective “to further the interoperability, readiness, and effectiveness of their respective Military Forces through increased logistic cooperation.”130
According to the agreement, the EU “shall ensure that its Member
States, directly or through Athena [the EU’s internal mechanism
for financing common costs of military operations], reimburse the
United States of America for all Logistic Support, Supplies, and
Services provided by the United States of America pursuant to this
Agreement,”131 and vice versa.132
Moreover, in 2011, the U.S. and EU concluded a Framework
the U.S. State Department as having been concluded with the EU, but with the respective EU agency.
126
See Agreement between the government of the United States of America
and the European Union on the security of classified information, U.S.-EU, Apr.
30, 2007, T.I.A.S. 07-430.1 (establishing security measures regarding the exchange
of classified information to further the common interest of security).
127
See Council Decision 2007/274/JHA of 23 April 2007 concerning the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union and the Government of
the United States of America on the security of classified information, pmbl., 2007
O.J. (L 115) 29 (referring to the pre-Lisbon TEU provisions in both areas).
128
This description is attributed to former Belgian Foreign Minister Mark
Eyskens, made in 1991, cited by Craig R. Whitney, WAR IN THE GULF: EUROPE;
Gulf Fighting Shatters Europeans’ Fragile Unity, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 1991),
http://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/25/world/war-in-the-gulf-europe-gulffighting-shatters-europeans-fragile-unity.html [https://perma.cc/PSN8-77R8].
129 See Van der Loo & Wessel, supra note 111, at 793.
130 Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement between the European Union
and the United States of America (ACSA), EU-U.S., pmbl., Dec. 6, 2016, 2016 O.J.
(L 350) 3.
131 Id. at art. V, ¶ 1.
132 Id. at art. V, ¶ 2.
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Agreement on the Participation of the United States of America in
European Union Crisis Management Operations.133 It lays down
“general conditions” for the U.S. contributing to EU missions, “rather than defining these conditions on a case-by-case basis for each
operation concerned.”134 However, while similar agreements with
other countries include also the contribution of military assets,135
this agreement is restricted to “contributions of civilian personnel,
units, and assets by the U.S. to EU crisis management operations
(the ‘U.S. contingent’).”136 As with other third country participating arrangements in CSDP operations, U.S. contingents would remain within the national chain of command,137 while at the same
time such participation “shall be without prejudice to the decisionmaking autonomy of the European Union.”138
The framework agreement has not been made use of to date.
Nevertheless, before the framework agreement, there was already
an active practice of the U.S. contributing to EU operations. Based
on specific agreements for American participation in “EULEX
KOSOVO,” the EU’s Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo,139 the U.S.
contributed by deploying eighty police officers and eight judges
and prosecutors.140
133 Framework Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on the Participation of the United States of America in European
Union Crisis Management Operations, EU-U.S., pmbl., May 17, 2011, T.I.A.S. 11601.
134 Id.
135
See Agreement between the European Union and the Kingdom of Norway Establishing a Framework for the Participation of the Kingdom of Norway in
the European Union Crisis-Management Operations, EU-Nor., Dec. 3, 2004, 2005
O.J. (L67) 8 (setting out the terms of Norway’s contributions to EU crisismanagement operations).
136 Framework Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union, supra note 133, at art. 2, ¶ 2.
137 Id. at art. 6, ¶ 2.
138 Id. at art. 1, ¶ 3.
139
See Agreement between the United States of America and the European
Union on the Participation of the United States of America in the European Union
Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, U.S.-EU, EULEX KOSOVO, pmbl., Oct. 22, 2008,
T.I.A.S. 08-1022 (furthering “the shared desire of the United States and the European Union to collaborate closely in supporting the development of Kosovo’s
democratic standards”).
140
See ERWAN LAGADEC, TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY:
EUROPE, AMERICA AND THE RISE OF THE REST 142 (2012) (describing the U.S. contribution to operations); see also Thierry Tardy, CSDP: Getting Third States on Board,
European Union Institute for Security Studies Issue Brief No. 6 (Mar. 2014), at 2
(noting that the “United States has contributed to three operations (EULEX Kosovo, EUSEC RD Congo, EUPOL RD Congo), mainly by providing advisors and
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Lastly, and as the only case of “mixity” in a bilateral agreement
in force between the U.S. and EU, the Agreement on the Promotion, Provision and Use of Galileo and Global Positioning System
(“GPS”) Satellite-Based Navigation Systems and Related Applications was signed in 2004 and entered into force in 2011 after ratification by all parties.141 As a “mixed agreement,” it includes as parties the U.S. on one side, and the EU and its Member States on the
other. The State Department’s Treaties in Force lists the agreement
under the thematic heading “Maritime Affairs,”142 whereas for the
EU it falls under “Trans-European Networks.”143 However, the
agreement touches upon several policy areas. It notes in the preamble that the American GPS is “a dual use system that provides
precision timing, navigation, and position location signals for civil
and military purposes”144 and lists as one of the objectives of the
agreement the desire “to promote open markets and to facilitate
growth in trade with respect to commerce in global navigation and
timing goods.”145
This agreement is therefore unusual in terms of the width of its
content. As a result, there was a need to include the Member States
as parties in accordance with the EU’s system of external relations
law. Another factor prompting its “mixed” character was pressure
from the U.S. to clarify responsibility and liability issues. Hence,
the agreement stipulates:
If it is unclear whether an obligation under this Agreement
is within the competence of either the European Community or its Member States, at the request of the United States,
personnel to assist the work of the police, prosecution and judiciary.”).
141
See Agreement on the Promotion, Provision and Use of Galileo and GPS
Satellite-Based Navigation Systems and Related Applications, supra note 79. See
also Peter M. Olson, Mixity from the Outside: The Perspective of a Treaty Partner, in
MIXED AGREEMENTS REVISITED: THE EU AND ITS MEMBER STATES IN THE WORLD 331,
332 (Christophe Hillion & Panos Koutrakos eds., 2010) (noting that this was the
first ever bilateral mixed agreement that the U.S. concluded).
142 U.S. Dep’t of St., supra note 81, at 146.
143
See Council Decision of 12 December 2011 on the Conclusion of the
Agreement on the Promotion, Provision and Use of Galileo and GPS SatelliteBased Navigation Systems and Related Applications between the European
Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the United States of
America, of the other part, EU-U.S., pmbl., 2011 O.J. (L 348) 1 (identifying as the
agreement’s substantive legal basis TFEU arts. 171 and 172).
144
Agreement on the Promotion, Provision and Use of Galileo and GPS Satellite-Based Navigation Systems and Related Applications, supra note 79, at first
recital of the pmbl.
145 Id. at eighth recital of the preamble.
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the European Community and its Member States shall provide the necessary information. Failure to provide this information with all due expediency or the provision of contradictory information shall result in joint and several
liability.146
This may be due to the desire from the American side to “have
the division of powers—and concomitant responsibility—between
Union and Member States clearly spelled out to them”147 or, failing
that, accept joint and several liability.148 Given this limited, and already not altogether positive experience of the U.S. with bilateral
mixed agreements,149 further uncertainty infused by Brexit can be
expected to create an even stronger call for legal clarity from the
American side.
3.2.2. Multilateral
In addition to bilateral treaties, the U.S. and EU are members of
international organizations and parties to a range of multilateral
agreements. In multilateral settings, “mixity” is more common for
the EU. Nevertheless, the EU is not as well represented in international fora and global conventions as one might expect given the
extensive external powers the Member States have conferred upon
it.150 This is due to the fact that certain international treaties only
146
Id. at art. 19, ¶ 2. See also id. at art. 18, (designating as the parties on the
European side “the European Community or its Member States or the European
Community and its Member States, within their respective areas of competence”).
147
Pieter Jan Kuijper & Esa Paasivirta, EU International Responsibility and its
Attribution: From the Inside Looking Out, in THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF
THE EUROPEAN UNION EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 45, 52 (Malcolm
Evans & Panos Koutrakos eds., 2013).
148 See Olson, supra note 141, at 343–44 (stressing that this issue was a contentious point in the negotiations).
149 Id. at 344 (noting that “[n]either side was happy with the result, however,
nor is it clear that either would be prepared to accept a similar solution in other
cases.”).
150
See generally Inge Govaere et. al., In-Between Seats: The Participation of the
European Union in International Organizations, 9 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 155 (2004)
(discussing issues concerning the EU’s limited role in international organizations);
Jan Wouters et. al., The EU in the World of International Organizations: Diplomatic
Aspirations, Legal Hurdles and Political Realities, in THE DIPLOMATIC SYSTEM OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION: EVOLUTION, CHANGE AND CHALLENGES 94 (Stephan Keukeleire et.
al. eds., 2015) (noting the discrepancy between the ambitions enshrined in the EU
Treaties after the Lisbon reform for the EU’s engagement with international or-

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019

32

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 40:1

allow states to become parties, which also limits the EU’s ability to
join certain international organizations.151 Examples of cases where
the EU would have had the internal power to conclude the agreement include conventions adopted in the framework of the International Labor Organization and the UN Charter (where it could
appear alongside its Member States).152 In the case of the UN, the
EU achieved “enhanced observer status” at the General Assembly
in 2011.153 Membership, however, remains impossible.
There has been a trend more recently to allow “regional (economic) integration organizations” to accede to treaties and to join
specific international organizations. It is by virtue of these possibilities that the EU and U.S. find themselves bound in larger multilateral frameworks. Prominent examples include the WTO154 and
the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.155 For the time being, it also includes the Paris Climate Agreement,156 from which, however, the U.S. has signaled its intention to
withdraw.157 It includes, moreover, a range of technical multilatganizations and the reality where the EU faces numerous legal and political obstacles).
151
See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 4, ¶ 1 (“Membership in the United Nations is
open to all other peace-loving states …”); North Atlantic Treaty art. 10, Apr. 4,
1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243 (“The Parties may, by unanimous agreement,
invite any other European State …”).
152
On the former, see Marco Ferri, Coordination Between the European Union
and its Member States, in THE EUROPEAN UNION IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 77, 78 (Christine Kaddous ed., 2015); on the latter, see
Mariangela Zappia, The United Nations: A European Union Perspective, in THE
EUROPEAN UNION IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 25,
27 (Christine Kaddous ed., 2015) (noting that at the UN, the EU “intervenes in all
areas, ranging from environmental, to development, labour, telecommunications,
humanitarian, disarmament, human rights and highly political issues”).
153 G.A. Res. 65/276 (May 3, 2011).
154 Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 106, at art XI, ¶ 1 (“The contracting parties to GATT 1947 as of the date of entry into force of this Agreement, and the European Communities, … shall become original Members of the WTO”).
155
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, art. 14, ¶
1, Sept. 16, 1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 29 (“This Convention and any protocol shall be
open for accession by States and by regional economic integration organizations
…”).
156
Paris Agreement, art. 20, ¶ 1, Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. 16-1104 (“This
Agreement shall be open for signature and subject to ratification, acceptance or
approval by States and regional economic integration organizations …”).
157
Media Note, U.S. Dep’t of St., Communication Regarding Intent to Withdraw
from
Paris
Agreement
(Aug.
4,
2017),
https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/08/273050.htm
[https://perma.cc/UB2S-HZSA]. According to art. 28, ¶ 1 of the Paris Agreement, supra note 156, which the U.S. signed on April 22, 2016, withdrawal is pos-
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eral agreements,158 as well as in the area of commodities.159 In order to illustrate the global presence and ambitions of both the U.S.
and EU, one can point to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in
Southeast Asia, of which both are parties.160
A special case from the area of international security is the Iran
Nuclear Deal, negotiated by the “P5+1”, which included representation from the EU and is hence sometimes rendered by the latter
as “E3+3” (France, Germany, and the UK as EU Members, plus
China, Russia, and the U.S.).161 The deal is not an international
agreement for the purposes of international law, but instead was
enshrined in the form of a “Joint Statement by EU High Representative Federica Mogherini and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad
Zarif”162 as well as in a document published by the U.S. State Department on “Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
Regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Nuclear Program”.163 The
sible at the earliest three years from the date of entry into force of the agreement,
which was on Nov. 4, 2016.
158
See, e.g., Agreement Concerning the Establishing of Global Technical
Regulations for Wheeled Vehicles, Equipment and Parts Which can be Fitted
and/or be Used on Wheeled Vehicles, art. 2, ¶ 1, June 25, 1998, 2119 U.N.T.S. 129
(“regional economic integration organizations … may become Contracting Parties to this Agreement”).
159 See, e.g., International Coffee Agreement, art. 2, ¶ 5, Sept. 28, 2007, T.I.A.S.
11-202 (“Contracting Party means a Government, the European Community or
any intergovernmental organization referred to in paragraph (3) of Article 4 …”).
160
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, Feb. 24, 1976, 1025
U.N.T.S. 297. It entered into force for the U.S. in 2009 and for the UK and EU in
2012, after the Treaty had been amended to allow states and regional organizations outside of Southeast Asia to join. See Third Protocol amending the Treaty of
Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, art. 18, ¶ 3, July 23, 2010, Cm. 8294
(“This Treaty shall be open for accession by States outside Southeast Asia and regional organisations whose members are only sovereign States subject to the consent of all the States in Southeast Asia, namely, Brunei Darussalam, the Kingdom
of Cambodia …”).
161 See, e.g., Sebastian Harnisch, Minilateral Cooperation and Transatlantic Coalition-Building: The E3/EU-3 Iran Initiative, 16 EUR. SECURITY 1 (2007) (making frequent use of the “E3/EU-3” acronym).
162
Joint Statement by EU High Representative Federica Mogherini and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif Switzerland, European External Action Service
(Apr.
2,
2015),
https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquartershomepage/3477/joint-statement-eu-high-representative-federica-mogherini-andiranian-foreign-minister-javad_en [https://perma.cc/P7E2-5QFK].
163
Media Note, U.S. Dep’t of State, Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action Regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Nuclear Program, (Apr. 2,
2015),
https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/04/240170.htm
[https://perma.cc/MG3R-H8ZK].
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framework was later specified in the “Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action” of July 2015.164 In May 2018, the U.S. withdrew from the
Iran Deal,165 thus making it no longer an EU-U.S. transatlantic
commitment.
In the multilateral sphere, this also means that delegations of
the U.S. and EU sit together in the organs of a number of international organizations and at times face each other as litigants in international disputes. The most prominent example of the latter is
litigation at the WTO. The U.S. and EU are both very active litigants in this forum, having faced each other in more than fifty cases.166
It should be noted that, both in the bilateral and the multilateral
setting, the EU’s presence does not automatically entail the absence
of its Member States. Some of these settings are mixed. An example for a non-mixed multilateral setting is the Agreement on DutyFree Treatment of Multi-Chip Integrated Circuits (MCPs) from
2005, which includes as parties the EU and the U.S., as well as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan (the latter in its capacity as a WTO
member under the name “Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan,
Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu”).167
A particularly intricate example of a mixed agreement is the socalled “Open Skies” agreement. It was signed originally in 2007
between the U.S. on the one, and the EU and its Member States on
the other side.168 It has not entered into force, but has been “provisionally applied” since March 2008.169 Though starting out as a bi164
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, European External Action Service
(July
14,
2015),
http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/statementseeas/docs/iran_agreement/iran_joint-comprehensive-plan-of-action_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M7DH-GWZT].
165
Mark Landler, Trump Abandons Iran Nuclear Deal He Long Scorned, N.Y.
TIMES,
May
8,
2018,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nucleardeal.html [https://perma.cc/4YGR-WK5Z].
166
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, FIND DISPUTES CASES (2018),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/find_dispu_cases_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/9E8S-XGTP] (which shows that as of August 2018, the EU has
appeared as either complainant or respondent 184 times in WTO disputes; the
U.S. in 269 cases).
167
Agreement on Duty-Free Treatment of Multi-Chip Integrated Circuits
(MCPs), Nov. 28, 2005, T.I.A.S. 06-401.
168 Air Transport Agreement, Apr. 30, 2007, 2007 O.J. (L 134) 4.
169
Decision 2007/339/EC of the Council and the Representatives of the
Governments of the Member States of the European Union, meeting within the
Council of 25 April 2007 on the signature and provisional application of the Air
Transport Agreement between the European Community and its Member States,
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lateral agreement, it was subsequently “multilateralized” by virtue
of an agreement concluded in 2011 to allow Norway and Iceland to
accede to the arrangement.170 However, despite the additional
non-EU parties, the agreement retains a largely bilateral structure,
due to the fact that Norway and Iceland are “fully integrated
members of the single European Aviation Market through the
Agreement on the European Economic Area,”171 An institutional
consequence of this is that within the Joint Committee set up under
‘Open Skies,’ the position of the EU and its Member States, as well
as that of Iceland and Norway, “shall be presented by the Commission, except in areas within the EU that fall exclusively within
Member States’ competence, in which case it shall be presented by
the Presidency of the Council or by the Commission, Iceland and
Norway as appropriate.”172
Hence, in the multilateral sphere the Member States can continue to appear alongside the EU, and sometimes even instead of
the EU, including in their treaty relations with the United States.
In each instance, however, their nature as EU members should be
taken into account, as should be the EU’s position as a non-state
entity that does not fully replace its members.
3.3. The 28 Member States as “Strange Subjects”
In international relations scholarship, the EU has been described as a “strange animal,”173 given that it is “not quite a state
but with more powers than many nation states in the international
system.”174 This is due, politically, to its still considerable combined capacities,175 and, legally, to its supranational features.
However, as De Witte rightly pointed out, not only the EU, but alon the one hand, and the Unites States of America, on the other hand, 2007 O.J. (L
134) 1.
170
Air Transport Agreement, U.S.-EU (Iceland, Norway), June 21, 2011,
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/170897.pdf. This agreement is
not in force but provisionally applied.
171 Ancillary Agreement, June 21, 2011, 2011 O.J. (L 283) 16.
172 Id. at art. 3, ¶ 2.
173
FRASER CAMERON, AN INTRODUCTION TO EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY 6 (2d
ed., 2012).
174 Id.
175 Andrew Moravcsik, Europe Is Still a Superpower, FOREIGN POLICY (Apr. 13,
2017),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/04/13/35uropa-is-still-a-superpower/
[https://perma.cc/DC4E-SA9K].
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so its Member States have become strange subjects of international
law.176 This is due mainly to the tension between, on the one hand,
having conferred extensive powers upon the EU to act internationally, and, on the other, the desire to remain present themselves on
the international scene. In contrast to the constitutional framework
of the U.S. with its “sole organ” 177 and “Commander in Chief”178
running the nation’s foreign affairs, one could thus speak of a rather “open” version of “foreign affairs federalism” in the case of
the EU.179 As the EU’s 2016 Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy formulated it: “EU foreign policy is not a solo performance: it is an orchestra which plays from the same score.”180
To make sure that this “orchestra” plays in harmony, EU external relations law has developed a number of principles, many of
which have a constraining effect on the freedom of the Member
States when acting internationally. To mention the most important
ones, there is, first, the duty to respect the Union’s “exclusive competences.” These are areas which have been explicitly designated
as such in the EU Treaties,181 but also those where the Union has
adopted “common rules” which may be affected by international
actions of the Member States.182 This means that Member States
can become pre-empted from acting as new EU rules are being
adopted.183 In those areas “only the Union may legislate and adopt
legally binding acts, the Member States being able to do so them176
Bruno De Witte, The Emergence of a European System of Public International
Law: The EU and its Member States as Strange Subjects, in THE EUROPEANISATION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 39 (Jan Wouters et. Al. eds., 2008).
177
The term “sole organ” dates back to 1800, when Chief Justice Marshall
used it in a speech to Congress: “The President is the sole organ of the nation in its
external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations,” as cited in
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936); see also
LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 41–45 (2d ed., 1996).
178 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
179 Schütze, supra note 112, at 65.
180 SHARED VISION COMMON ACTION: A STRONGER EUROPE, supra note 55, at 46.
181 TFEU, supra note 28, at art. 3, ¶ 1.
182 The latter is also known as the “ERTA” effect after the seminal decision in
Case 22/70, Commission v. Council, 1971 E.C.R. 263. See Cremona, supra note 76
(discussing the different kinds of EU external competence and the evolution of
case law on this matter over time).
183
Opinion 1/03, Competence of the Community to conclude the new Lugano Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, 2006 E.C.R. I-01145, ¶ 126 (noting that it
“is also necessary to take into account not only the current state of Community
law in the area in question but also its future development, insofar as that is foreseeable at the time of that analysis …”); see also Cremona, supra note 76, at 249–50.
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selves only if so empowered by the Union or for the implementation of Union acts.”184
Where there is no EU Treaty-based exclusive competence or
common rules, Member States are still bound by what the Treaty
on European Union calls the “principle of sincere cooperation.”185
The principle operates in such a way to ensure that Member States
do not negotiate international agreements in parallel to the EU,186
or even set in motion procedures in international fora that disturb
the “unity in the international representation of the Union and its
Member States.”187 In other areas, the EU and Member States can
continue to act in parallel. These include development cooperation
and humanitarian aid.188 Regarding the CFSP/CSDP in particular,
cooperation is framed as “political solidarity”189 rather than as a
rigid legally enforceable obligation.190 While sincere cooperation in
all these instances applies as a legal duty, its effects and degrees of
justiciability change.191 In the area of security and defense in particular, the Member States retain a large degree of flexibility and
freedom to act internationally.
Thus, the Member States of the EU, while being the sovereign
equals of other states from the point of view of international law,
are legally constrained in their foreign relations in significant ways.
This is the defining feature of ‘transatlantic trigonometry’: Even
TFEU, supra note 28, at art. 2, ¶ 1.
TEU, supra note 28, at art. 4, ¶ 3.
186
See Case C-433/03, Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany, 2005
E.C.R. I-06985 (holding that Germany had violated EU regulations by forming bilateral agreements with Romania, Poland, and Ukraine).
187
See Case C-246/07, Commission v. Kingdom of Sweden, 2010 E.C.R. I03317, ¶ 104 (stating that Sweden, by unilaterally adding to a list of pollutants,
would likely compromise the “principle of unity in the international representation of the Union and its Member States”); see also Andrés Delgado Casteleiro &
Joris Larik, The Duty to Remain Silent: Limitless Loyalty in EU External Relations?, 36
EUR. L. REV. 522, 533 (2011) (discussing that the duty is in principle reciprocal, but
in practice has been applied predominantly to restrain Member State actions).
188 TFEU, supra note 28, at art. 4, ¶ 4.
189 TEU, supra note 28, at art. 24, ¶ 3, subpara. 2.
190 Id. at art. 24, ¶ 1, subpara. 2 (excluding largely the jurisdiction of the CJEU
from this area and noting that the “adoption of legislative acts shall be excluded,”
which could produce a preemptive effect).
191
See Joris Larik, Pars Pro Toto: The Member States’ Obligations of Sincere Cooperation, Solidarity and Unity, in STRUCTURAL PRINCIPLES IN EU EXTERNAL
RELATIONS LAW 175, 183–84 (Marise Cremona ed., 2018) (“… [Q]uestions remain,
first, to what extent these legal duties incumbent on the Member States fall under
the jurisdiction of the CJEU, and if so, to what extent they are justiciable and with
what consequences.”).
184
185

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019

38

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 40:1

when international legal relations between Washington and an EU
Member State are at stake, Brussels is always the third point to
keep in mind. At times, this is as obvious as being a treaty partner
alongside the Member States, while at other times it is in more subtle and implicit ways, where the EU itself does not feature as a treaty party of the U.S. This applies to both bilateral and multilateral
settings.
3.3.1. Bilateral
The U.S. maintains bilateral treaty relations with all EU Member States, amounting to many hundreds of treaties currently in
force between them. Among those are 160 treaties in force with the
UK.192 Rather than attempting to cover them all, which would be a
highly repetitive exercise, a number of general patterns can be
highlighted with particular regard to the relationship with the EU
in the background.
First, the treaties in force between the U.S. and EU Member
States, which are not mixed in that they do not include the EU as a
party, reflect the policy areas in which Member States retain competences of their own. Otherwise put, this concerns powers which
have not been conferred upon the EU in such a way that the Member States would be preempted from acting. This includes, for instance, treaties in the military domain.193 At the same time, as was
seen above, this does not preclude the EU from concluding bilateral treaties with the U.S. on military matters under its Common
Security and Defence Policy without the Member States as parties
(supra 3.2.1). In other cases, treaties regulate territorial matters or
issues relating to the settlement of historical disputes,194 which are
issues that fall outside the scope of EU law or where Member State
powers are clearly retained.195
192
U.S. Dep’t of St., supra note 81, at 485–95, and not counting any of the
treaties the UK has with the U.S. on behalf of various overseas territories.
193
See, e.g., Agreement between the Department of Defense of the United
States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the Kingdom of Denmark Concerning Ballistic Missile Defense Technology, U.S.-Den., Oct. 25, 2005 (extending
United States Ballistic Missile Defense System protection to Denmark).
194 See, e.g., Treaty on the delimitation in the Caribbean of a maritime boundary relating to the U.S. Virgin Islands and Anguilla, Anguilla-U.S., Nov. 5, 1993,
1913 U.N.T.S. 5.
195 See TEU, supra note 28, at art. 4, ¶ 2 (stating that the EU “shall respect [the
Member States’] essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integ-
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Second, at the other end of the spectrum of the impact of EU
membership obligations, are those areas where the EU has exclusive competences. There, Member States are preempted from acting and hence are barred from negotiating treaties with the U.S.
This explains the absence of trade and trade-related agreements between the U.S. and individual Member States. This issue came
clearly to the fore in a phone conversation between the U.S. President and German Chancellor Merkel in 2017. According to media
reports, the President asked repeatedly about bilateral trade negotiations with Germany and “[e]very time the Chancellor replied:
‘You can’t do a trade deal with Germany, only the EU.’”196
In between these two extremes, there is a grey area of evolving
legislation and policy.197 This fluidity does not make the collective
of the Union and Member States an easy partner on the international stage, as could be seen already from the American concerns
about liability in the GPS/Galileo Agreement (supra 3.2.1). Other
examples of relevance in transatlantic relations include air
transport services and bilateral investment treaties. For example, a
number of Member States, but not the UK, have concluded bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with the U.S., mostly from before
they became EU members.198 Subsequently, the EU has acquired
exclusive powers in matters relating to foreign direct investment
and started developing its own investment policy.199 It has not,
rity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security.”).
196
Lucy Pasha-Robinson, Angela Merkel “had to Explain Fundamentals of EU
Trade to Donald Trump 11 Times”, INDEPENDENT (Apr. 24, 2017),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/39uropa3939/us-politics/angelamerkel-donald-trump-explain-eu-trade-11-times-germany-chancellor-uspresident-a7699591.html [https://perma.cc/J8RY-EHJV].
197
See Friedrick Erlbacher, Recent Case Law on the External Competences of the
European Union: How Member States can Embrace their own Treaty (Ctr. For the Law
of
EU
External
Rel.,
Working
Paper
No.
43,
2017)
http://www.asser.nl/media/3485/cleer17-2_web.pdf, [https://perma.cc/7XSWKGKB] (arguing, among other things, that situations where Member State action
becomes pre-empted by the EU’s international agreements is rare and that reducing mixity will not lead to the disappearance of the Member States from the international stage).
198
See e.g., Treaty between the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of the Republic of Latvia Concerning the Encouragement
and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, with Annex and Protocol, U.S.-Lat., Jan.
13, 1995, T.I.A.S. 96-1226.
199
See Angelos Dimopoulos, Creating an EU Foreign Investment Policy: Challenges for the Future, in EU EXTERNAL RELATIONS LAW AND POLICY IN THE POSTLISBON ERA 401 (Paul James Cardwell ed., 2011) (discussing challenges related to
the development of EU foreign investment policy).
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however, acquired powers over non-direct (portfolio) investments,200 while the legality of BITs concluded by EU Member
States remains in limbo.201
In the area of air transport, several Member States had bilateral
treaties as well, including with the U.S.202 Due to the provisional
application of the U.S.-EU “Open Skies” Agreement mentioned
above (supra 3.2.2), 23 such agreements are suspended “for the duration of provisional application” of the U.S.-EU Air Transport
Agreement.203 This is also the case for the UK, whose agreement
on “North Atlantic air fares” with the U.S. entered into force in
1978.204
Hence, if the U.S. were to engage an EU Member State in treaty
negotiations, it may receive starkly different reactions depending
on the subject matter and legislative state of play. It may either
proceed when a Member State is confident that the issues to be addressed continue to fall within its own powers, though remaining
weary not to violate any other EU law obligations—present and future—while doing so. Or it may reject American advances, as it
would be recruited into breaching existing obligations under EU
law or exercising powers it conferred on the Union. In the latter
scenario, the U.S. would try to bend what is arguably the most solid side of the triangular relationship.

200
See Opinion 2/15, Free Trade Agreement between the European Union
and the Republic of Singapore, ECLI:EU:C:2017:376, 2017, ¶ 238, https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A62015CV0002%2801%29
[https://perma.cc/V6A4-KS99].
201
See Case C-284/16, Slowakische Republik v. Achmea BV, judgement of
Mar. 6, 2018 (not yet reported) (holding that the arbitration clauses contained in
BITs between EU Member States are incompatible with EU law). For BITs between Member States and third countries, a regime of authorization by the European Commission is in place. See also Regulation (EU) 1219/2012 of the European
Parliament and of the Council, 2012 O.J. (L 351) 40 (establishing transitional arrangements for bilateral investment agreements between Member States and third
countries).
202
See, e.g., Air Transport Agreement between the United States of America
and the Federal Republic of Germany, U.S.-Ger., July 7, 1955, 7 U.S.T. 527, T.I.A.S.
3536 (establishing mutual rights for aircraft of either party and specifying how
flights between the two countries can operate).
203
See, U.S. Dep’t of St., supra note 81, at 22, 35, 55, 114, 121, 153, 162, 177,
205, 226, 238, 239, 289, 301, 338, 390, 393, 398, 425, 439, 450, and 495.
204
Agreement on Air Transport Services, U.K.-U.S., Mar. 17, 1978, 29 U.S.T.
2676, T.I.A.S. 8964.
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3.3.2. Multilateral
In the multilateral sphere, a distinction needs to be made again
between “mixed” and “non-mixed” settings, i.e., whether the EU is
a party alongside the Member States. From a Member State’s point
of view, this includes scenarios where it would face the U.S. among
other third parties, sometimes with also the EU being present as a
party, as an (enhanced) observer, or not at all. In the latter case,
however, the presence of the EU may still be felt where Member
States are compelled to act in the EU’s interest.
An example where all are present is the WTO (see supra 3.2.2).
The Member States’ presence there was justified given that the
WTO Agreements covered more than the scope of the Common
Commercial Policy (“CCP”) at the time of its founding, for instance, with regard to intellectual property rights.205 Today, given
the expanded scope of the CCP, it is more questionable that the
Member States are still legally required in Geneva, though even
with very limited shared powers, a case for “mixity” can still be
made.206 In practice, the European Commission represents the EU
and the Member States at the WTO. This includes dispute settlement and cases that have been launched against individual Member States.207 The Member States’ very limited role in the WTO is
justified in EU external relations law. Given the expanse of exclusive competence in this area, complemented by the duty of sincere
cooperation, Member States must tread very carefully lest they violate their obligations under EU law.
Moreover, the principles of exclusivity and sincere cooperation
apply in international settings where the Member States are represented, but the EU cannot be despite having been conferred powers in the area at hand. Such situations arise because certain multilateral organizations do not allow for non-state entities to become
205
See Opinion 1/94, Competence of the Community to Conclude International Agreements Concerning Services and the Protection of Intellectual Property,
1994
E.C.R.
I-05267,
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A61994CV0001
[https://perma.cc/6GDZN7UZ].
206 See Joris Larik, Sincere Cooperation in the Common Commercial Policy: Lisbon,
a “Joined-Up” Union, and “Brexit”, 8 EUR. YBK. INT’L ECON. L. 83, 105-06 (2017).
207
See Andrés Delgado Casteleiro & Joris Larik, The “Odd Couple”: Responsibility of the EU at the WTO, in THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION: EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 233, 239–40 (Malcolm Evans
& Panos Koutrakos eds., 2013) (summarizing the practice of the EU stepping in to
defend its Member States in WTO disputes).
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members (see supra 3.2.2). But even here, though the EU is not represented by its own institutions, other countries, including the U.S.,
have to remember the “triangular” relationship nonetheless. This
includes forums such as the ILO and IMO, where EU Member
States are bound to act under EU law in the Union’s interest to the
extent that they are—vicariously—exercising EU competences.208
In the domains where EU membership obligations are less
stringent, the EU-Member State side of the triangle is less rigid.
For instance, at the United Nations, all Member States are represented, but the EU cannot be a member. When measures fall in the
area of security and defense policy, the Member States are freer to
act. In principle, they remain bound by the duty of sincere cooperation, but the jurisdiction of the EU Court of Justice is excluded
from this area.209 Moreover, the Member States added declarations
to the EU Treaties affirming their independent role, especially as
permanent members of the UN Security Council.210 Hence, when
U.S. representatives face their French counterparts, they can assume that they will act and vote on behalf of their country, largely
unconstrained by EU membership. Nonetheless, as the Kadi saga
on the constitutionality of targeted UN sanctions under EU law illustrates, the EU Member States may in principle be compelled to
refuse implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions, even if
they helped adopt them in the first place.211
Another example from the security domain and pillar of the
transatlantic relationship is NATO, of which the EU itself cannot
become a member either.212 By contrast, 22 EU Member States are
members of NATO. The non-NATO members in the EU are: Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta, and Sweden, which maintain
security policies of neutrality or non-alignment.213 A loose cooper208 See Case C-45/07, Comm’n v. Hellenic Republic, 2009 E.C.R. 81, ¶ 31 (“the
fact that the Community is not a member of an international 42uropa424242ion
does not prevent its external competence from being in fact exercised, in particular through the Member States acting jointly in the Community’s interest.”).
209 TEU, supra note 28, at art. 24, ¶ 3, subpara. 2.
210
See Declarations Annexed to the Final act of the Intergovernmental Conference which adopted the Treaty of Lisbon, signed on Dec. 13, 2007, 2012 O.J.
(C326) 345 (concerning the common foreign and security policy, stressing that the
provisions on the CFSP “will not affect the … powers of each Member State in relation to the formulation and conduct of its foreign policy, … and participation in
international organisations, including a Member State’s membership of the Security Council of the United Nations”).
211 See Kadi v. Council, supra note 77, at ¶ 285.
212 See supra note 151.
213
See JORIS LARIK, FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES IN EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL
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ative arrangement, “Berlin Plus”, exists between the EU and
NATO since 2002, but has been used only twice, in 2003 and
2004.214 Whereas the TEU explicitly notes that the EU has its own
security and defense policy, it also states that the EU “shall respect
the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common
defence realized in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
(NATO).”215 Hence, when the U.S. deals with EU Member States in
the North Atlantic Council, the EU-Member State side of the triangle is relatively weak.
Given the dichotomy of modes of operation of the EU in its external relations, as well as the diversity of international treaty settings, which cover different policy areas, mixed/non-mixed
agreements, and bilateral treaties with the Member States, the decision of a Member State to leave the EU will affect its respective
transatlantic triangle in various ways and to varying degrees.
4. ALTERNATIVE MODELS AND THEIR TRANSATLANTIC DIMENSION
As long as the UK is a member of the EU, its relationship with
the U.S. is of the same triangular nature as that of the other 27
Member States. Most importantly, the UK’s relations with the U.S.
require it to respect its obligations under EU law, particularly internal EU legislation, the EU’s external competences, and the duty
of sincere cooperation. This situation is fundamentally different
for non-EU Member States, whose relations with both the U.S. and
the EU and its Member States are governed by public international
law. Nonetheless, the closer the association of a third country with
the EU, the more that relationship acquires a triangular character.
The main difference is that these are a priori legally equal relationships within the framework of international law, instead of one being governed by international law and the other by EU law, which
enjoys primacy over domestic law of the Member States, including
their respective international legal commitments.216
LAW 192–94 (2016) (summarizing the security policies of the non-NATO EU
Member States).
214
See Steven Blockmans, The Influence of NATO on the Development of the
EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy, in BETWEEN AUTONOMY AND DEPENDENCE:
THE EU LEGAL ORDER UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 243,
259 (Ramses A. Wessel & Steven Blockmans eds., 2013).
215 See TEU, supra note 28, at art. 42, ¶ 2, subpara 2.
216 See supra note 77.
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In this section, four main models of treaty relations for third
countries with the EU are outlined, ranging from a closer association with the EU to looser arrangements. A fifth option would be
one without a particular bilateral treaty framework, governed only
by multilateral treaty frameworks and customary international
law. The UK’s Prime Minister appears strongly opposed to the
first three models (Norway, Switzerland and Turkey) in her Lancaster House Speech of January 2017 and subsequent key policy
statements.217 However, this may not be the last word and even after Brexit, the relationship between the UK and EU is not necessarily set in stone. A “hard” Brexit can be “softened” over time, and
vice versa. In any event, it remains useful to explore the available
options and what they entail in terms of the UK’s freedom of action
for interacting with the U.S.218
As the following models show, the difference—and difficulty—
lies in the economic sphere rather than that of security and defense.
The more sensitive the EU is to the sovereignty concerns of its own
Member States in the area of security and defense, the more unencumbered third countries closely associated with it are. By contrast, in the trade and regulatory sphere, the legal constraints on
the external maneuvering space of third countries are wideranging. For the U.S., this matters in terms of what to expect in its
interaction with a post-Brexit UK.

217
See Prime Minister Theresa May, Prime Minister’s Office, The government’s negotiating objectives for exiting the EU: PM speech 8–9 (Jan. 17, 2017),
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-governments-negotiatingobjectives-for-exiting-the-eu-pm-speech [https://perma.cc/6S2L-VT9X] (“So we
do not seek membership of the single market. . . . I do not want Britain to be part
of the Common Commercial Policy and I do not want us to be bound by the
Common External Tariff. These are the elements of the Customs Union that prevent us from striking our own comprehensive trade agreements with other countries.”). See also HM GOVERNMENT, THE FUTURE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED
KINGDOM AND THE EUROPEAN UNION, 2018, Cm. 9593, at 6 (UK) (in the foreword to
this White Paper, which followed the British cabinet talks at Chequers (the
“Chequers Plan”), the Prime Minister reiterated that the UK will be “leaving the
Single Market and the Customs Union, ending free movement and the jurisdiction
of the European Court of Justice in this country”).
218
See Mitchel van der Wel & Ramses A. Wessel, The Brexit Roadmap: Mapping the Choices and Consequences during the EU/UK withdrawal and Future Relationship Negotiations 73–75 (Ctr. For the Law of EU External Rel., Working Paper No.
5,
2017),
http://www.asser.nl/media/4140/cleer17-5_web.pdf,
[https://perma.cc/28J7-84XT] (noting the “Ukraine model” of an association
agreement as another variation on these main models that does not include EEA
membership or a customs union).
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4.1. Norway
The closest model of association with the EU is joining the European Economic Area (“EEA”). The EEA, set up in 1994,219 consists of the EU and European Free Trade Area (EFTA) countries
minus Switzerland (see infra 4.2.). This model is often referred to
as the “Norway model” in public discourse.220 Iceland and Liechtenstein are in a similar position regarding trade, but given that
Norway is also a NATO member with an army, it makes sense to
focus on it as a possibility for the United Kingdom.
As a member of the EEA, non-EU countries accept parts of the
acquis communautaire, i.e., EU laws and regulations, without having
a vote in their adoption. This arrangement is unique in that the
“EEA Agreement is the only EU external agreement to employ socalled homogeneity as a means of ensuring the actual adaptation of
the dynamic post-signature acquis communautaire into the legal orders of the EFTA member states.”221 This means EEA countries retain access to the EU’s internal market while the EU rests assured
that they comply with relevant EU rules as they continue to evolve.
EEA membership covers free movement of goods, services,
capital, and persons, as well as competition policy, but excludes
“the common agricultural, fisheries and transport policies, [direct
EU] budget contributions and regional policy, taxation, as well as
economic and monetary policy.”222 Norway hence has to respect
219
See Agreement on the European Economic Area, Mar. 17, 1993, 1994 O.J.
(L
1)
3,
https://www.jus.uio.no/english/services/library/treaties/09/901/eea_agreement.xml [https://perma.cc/4YG6-RQAN] [hereinafter EEA
Agreement] (founding the EEA, which brings together the EU Member States and
Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway). See also Sven Norberg & Martin Johansson,
The History of the EEA Agreement and the First Twenty Years of Its Existence, in THE
HANDBOOK OF EEA LAW 3, 15–32 (Carl Baudenbacher ed., 2016) (discussing the
origins and negotiating history of the EEA Agreement).
220
See Charlie Cooper, Macron to May: ‘Be my Guest’ to Norway-model Brexit,
POLITICO (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.politico.eu/article/45uropa4545-macrontheresa-may-france-uk-be-my-guest-to-norway-model-brexit/
[https://perma.cc/DXZ8-VZDX] (arguing that maintaining Britain’s financial
services industry’s access to the EU single market will require the UK to adopt the
Norway model).
221 Roman Petrov, Exporting the Acquis Communautaire into the Legal Systems of
Third Countries, 13 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 33, 37 (2008).
222
Sieglinde Gstöhl, Models of External Differentiation in the EU’s Neighbourhood: An Expanding Economic Community?, 22 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 854, 858 (2015). See
also Hannes Hofmeister, Splendid Isolation or Continued Cooperation? Options for a
State After Withdrawal from the EU, 21 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 249, 256 (2015) (discussing
the scope and content of EEA membership).
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the EU’s four freedoms, including free movement of persons,223
and in addition takes part in the passport-free “Schengen area.”224
Though EEA countries are consulted, they do not get to vote
within the EU’s legislative processes. Hence, under a Norwaymodel the UK “would be bound by many of the EU’s rules, but no
longer have a vote or veto on the creation of those rules.”225 Institutionally, the “main discussions take place within the EEA Joint
Committee in the so-called ‘decision-shaping phase’ after the [European] Commission transmits its proposals to the EU Council and
the European Parliament, as well as to the EEA EFTA states.”226
Subsequently, the EEA Joint Committee decides by consensus “as
closely as possible in time to the adoption of the rules in the EU institutions in order to allow for a more or less simultaneous application of the acquis”.227 Moreover, to make sure EEA countries comply, a special EFTA Surveillance Authority was created, which can
take EEA countries to an EFTA Court.228 This court, in turn, aligns
itself largely with the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU.229
223
See Kjartan Bjarni Björgvinsson, Free Movement of Persons, in THE
HANDBOOK OF EEA LAW 473 (Carl Baudenbacher ed., 2016) (stating that the EU’s
four freedoms are binding on non-EU countries that are members of the EEA).
224
Norway and Iceland assume these obligations by entering special agreements. See e.g., Agreement Concluded by the Council of the European Union, the
Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway Concerning the Latters’ Association with the Implementation, Application, and Development of the Schengen
Acquis, May 18, 1999, 1999 O.J. (L 176) 36, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A21999A0710%2802%29
[https://perma.cc/FTB7-AGRY] (exemplifying a special agreement whereby
Norway and Iceland consent to adopt the Schengen protocols).
225 HM GOVERNMENT, ALTERNATIVES TO MEMBERSHIP: POSSIBLE MODELS FOR THE
UNITED KINGDOM OUTSIDE THE EUROPEAN UNION 16 (Mar. 2016),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads
/attachment_data/file/504604/Alternatives_to_membership__possible_models_for_the_UK_outside_the_EU.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5D9NEVUJ] (acknowledging the UK’s loss of voting rights three months before the
Brexit referendum).
226 Gstöhl, supra note 222, at 858.
227 Id.
228 See id. (explaining EFTA’s enforcement power).
229
See EEA Agreement, supra note 219, at art. 6 (requiring homogeneous interpretation with CJEU case law only dating until the signature of the EEA
Agreements). But see, Joined Cases E-9/07 and E-10/07, L’Oréal Norge AS v. Aarskog Per AS & Others & Smart Club Norge, 2008 EFTA Ct. Rep. 258, ¶ 28 (“In its
interpretation of EEA rules, the Court has consistently taken into account the relevant rulings of the [CJEU] after the said date.”). See generally H.H. Fredriksen,
Bridging the Widening Gap between the EU Treaties and the Agreement on the European
Economic Area, 18 EUR. L. J. 868, 869–70 (2012) (discussing how the legislative homogeneity between EU and EEA law is complemented by the homogenous inter-
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However, all this does not make the EEA a borderless region.
For instance, customs and rules of origins checks at the NorwayEU border continue to apply.230 Nonetheless, it provides a largely
homogenous regulatory space and thus wide-ranging access to the
EU’s internal market.
In their external relations EEA countries are relatively unencumbered by the EU. They do not have to go along with the EU’s
Common Commercial Policy, the CFSP/CSDP, or other external
policies. EEA countries hence can negotiate free trade agreements
(“FTAs”) with other countries, which they do as a bloc of EFTA
countries.231 However, the EEA countries are limited in their scope
of maneuver in regulatory matters when negotiating trade agreements with other countries, as they need to maintain compliance
with the relevant EU rules in order to retain access to the internal
market. Neither Norway nor EFTA have a modern trade agreement with the U.S.,232 though FTAs are in force between EFTA and,
among others, Canada and South Korea.
In the area of security and defense policy, EEA countries are
completely free to go their own way. Norway and Iceland are
members of NATO, while Liechtenstein is not. Moreover, Norway
has numerous bilateral agreements with the U.S. in the defense
field.233 However, this freedom does not imply hostility towards
the EU’s CFSP/CSDP. To the contrary, Norway has contributed to
several EU military and civilian operations under a third-country
arrangement.234 Moreover, Norway officially aligns itself at times
with EU positions at the United Nations.235
pretations of the EFTA Court and CJEU).
230 HM GOVERNMENT, supra note 225, at 17.
231
See EFTA, FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS AND TRADE RELATIONS BY COUNTRY,
http://www.efta.int/free-trade/free-trade-agreements [https://perma.cc/KP7ZF3DK] (last visited Jan. 22, 2017) (overviewing how EEA countries negotiate free
trade agreements).
232 See U.S. Dep’t of St., supra note 81, at 334.
233 Id. at 330–31.
234
See Agreement between the European Union and the Kingdom of Norway Establishing a Framework for the Participation of the Kingdom of Norway to
the Crisis Management Operations Led by the European Union, Dec. 3, 2004, 2005
O.J. (L 67) 8, http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/prepareCreateTreaties
Workspace/treatiesGeneralData.do?step=0&redirect=true&treatyId=55
[https://perma.cc/FTB7-AGRY] (defining Norway’s right to contribute armed
forces to assist the EU in crisis management operations).
235 See, e.g., Anne Kemppainen, Minister Counsellor, Eur. Union, EU General
Statement delivered at the 72nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly
1st Committee: Vote on Cluster VII (Regional disarmament and security) concern-
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Consequently, it would be more accurate to speak of two
“Norway models.” First, there is the traditionally known model
for the economic and regulatory sphere, including free movement
of persons, which is restrictive and limits Norway’s international
action. Here, the EU side of the triangle remains strong. However,
a different kind of Norway model exists for the wider foreign policy and security sphere, which is not restrictive but allows for close
cooperation.
4.2. Switzerland
Unlike Norway’s case of EEA membership, the Swiss model is
constructed through a range of bilateral agreements.236 While
Switzerland is a member of EFTA and took part in the negotiations
for the EEA, it refused to join the latter in 1992 following a negative
domestic referendum result.237 The principal starting point for the
bilateral treaties was the 1972 FTA,238 which was followed by two
sets of more specific bilateral treaties in 1999239 and 2004,240 respectively. Since 2004, additional agreements have been concluded, including on cooperation with Europol, Eurojust, and the European
Defence Agency (EDA), cooperation between competition authoriing the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (Nov. 1, 2017) (transcript available
at https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-geneva/36634/eu-general-statement-–
-united-nations-1st-committee-vote-cluster-vi-comprehensive-nuclear-test_en)
[https://perma.cc/96HE-DBPP] (“[t]he EFTA countries Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as Ukraine . . . align
themselves with this statement.”).
236
See SWISS CONFEDERATION, DIRECTION DES AFFAIRES EUROPEENNES, LISTE DES
ACCORDS SUISSE–UNION EUROPEENNE EN VIGUEUR AU 1ER JANVIER 2017,
https ://www.eda.admin.ch/dam/dea/fr/documents
/publikationen_dea/accords-liste_fr.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7MN-89NU] (last
visited Jan. 22, 2017) (compiling a complete list of bilateral agreements, including
all additional protocols and amendments).
237 Norberg & Johansson, supra note 219, at 31.
238
Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Swiss
Confederation, July 22, 1972, 1972 O.J. (L 300) 189 (agreeing to promote the harmonious development of economic relations through the expansion of reciprocal
trade between the European Economic Community and Switzerland).
239
These cover free movement of persons, technical barriers to trade, public
procurement markets, agriculture, research, civil aviation, and overland transport.
240
These cover, inter alia, the Schengen (passport-free travel) and Dublin
Agreements (on asylum applications), taxation of savings, fight against fraud,
processed agricultural products, the environment, pensions, education, vocational
training, and youth.
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ties, satellite navigation, and company taxation.241
In the economic realm, Switzerland’s access to the EU’s internal
market is limited. For instance, it has “access to a significant degree of the trade in goods but agriculture is not covered”.242 Moreover, access in trade in services is limited, while the financial sector
is excluded.243 On the latter point, it is relevant to note that Switzerland cannot avail itself of the EU’s “passporting system that
minimises the regulatory, operational and legal barriers to the provision of financial services across the EU.”244 Instead, “Swiss banks
need to establish a subsidiary in an EU/EEA country … in order to
obtain financial services passporting rights.”245
Institutionally, the Swiss model “lacks an overarching structure
to deal with the around 20 main agreements, most of which are on
a technical level run by a consensus-based Joint Committee.”246
There is no equivalent to the above-mentioned EFTA Surveillance
Authority and EFTA Court, which would also contribute to supervising the relationship with the EU in view of ongoing legislative
and regulatory developments. The EU has been pushing for an institutionalized relationship for years,247 but thus far to no avail.248
Without institutionalization, enforcement is left entirely to the diplomatic realm. In particular, the agreement contains so-called

241
See SWISS CONFEDERATION, supra note 236 (listing the bilateral agreements
the Swiss Confederation has entered into with the EU).
242 Van der Wel & Wessel, supra note 218, at 69.
243
See Id. (noting that without the necessary passporting rights for financial
services, Swiss banks wanting to operate in EU countries are required to open a
subsidiary in an EU or EEA country).
244 HM GOVERNMENT, supra note 225, at 26.
245 Id.
246 Gstöhl, supra note 222, at 860.
247 See, e.g., Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on EU Relations with EFTA Countries, 3060th General Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, Dec.
14, 2010, ¶ 42, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/council_iceland.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W55X-34JV] (criticizing Switzerland’s approach for “a lack of
efficient arrangements for the take-over of new EU acquis including [CJEU] caselaw, and for ensuring the supervision and enforcement of the existing agreements
… [resulting] in legal uncertainty for authorities, operators and individual citizens.”).
248
See SABINE JENNI, SWITZERLAND’S DIFFERENTIATED EUROPEAN INTEGRATION:
THE LAST GALLIC VILLAGE? 176 (2016) (observing that forming an institutional
framework agreement between Switzerland and the EU is so controversial—with
the latter requesting a common monitoring and enforcement structure as well as
obliging Switzerland to adopt EU legislation—that the parties have not even
managed to set the terms of negotiation since 2012).
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“guillotine clauses”,249 which means that a whole set of agreements
cease to apply in case one of them is terminated or not renewed,250
which can result in Switzerland’s access to the EU’s internal market being cut off.
In this framework, Switzerland is free to conclude its own trade
agreements,251 though it remains bound by its commitments under
the bilateral agreements with the EU. Like Norway, it usually concludes trade agreements within the EFTA framework, though it
concluded a bilateral agreement with China.252 Like Norway, furthermore, it has no modern trade agreement with the U.S., either
bilaterally or through EFTA.
In the area of security and defense, similar to the Norway model, Switzerland remains unencumbered by its legal proximity to the
EU. Unlike Atlanticist Norway, it pursues traditionally a strategy
of neutrality.253 Nonetheless, it too has contributed to several of
the EU’s civil and military CSDP operations,254 though Switzerland
has not concluded a framework agreement with the EU to that effect. At the same time, it entertains a number of agreements in the
249
Stephan Breitenmoser, Sectoral Agreements between the EC and Switzerland:
Contents and Context, 40 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1137, 1160 (2003).
250
See, e.g., Agreement between the European Community and its Member
States, of the One Part, and the Swiss Confederation, of the Other, on the Free
Movement of Persons art. 25 ¶ 4, June 21, 1999, 2002 O.J. (L 141) 6, https://eurlex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:29b7e319-1314-4fbd-b1df-c0c0be226
feb.0004.02/DOC_1&format=PDF [https://perma.cc/52DT-TCX8] (“The seven
Agreements referred to in paragraph 1 shall cease to apply six months after receipt of notification of non-renewal referred to in paragraph 2 or termination referred to in paragraph 3.”).
251 See HM GOVERNMENT, supra note 225, at 27 ¶ 3.31 (noting that Switzerland
has 29 of its own trade agreements covering 41 countries).
252
See Freihandelsabkommen zwischen der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft und der Volksrepublik China [Free Trade Agreement between the People’s
Republic of China and the Swiss Confederation], July 6, 2013 Switz.-China.,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2751
[https://perma.cc/KUK2-3V5J] (entered into force in 2014, establishing a free
trade area between China and Switzerland).
253
See HM GOVERNMENT, supra note 225, at 27 (“In foreign policy, Switzerland has a tradition of neutrality.”).
254
See, e.g., Participation Agreement between the European Union and the
Swiss Confederation on the Participation of the Swiss Confederation in the European Union CSDP Mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali), Apr. 13, 2016, 2016 O.J. (L
105)
3,
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:22016A0421(01)&from=EN
[https://perma.cc/AYZ7-VAJT] (agreeing to participate in the EU’s capacity
building mission in Mali). See also Tardy, supra note 140, at 3 (providing overview
of third countries’ contributions to CSDP operations).
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field of defense with the United States.255 Unlike Norway, other
EEA and EU candidate countries, Switzerland has no track record
of formally aligning itself with EU statements and positions. In
terms of trigonometry in treaty relations, the same flexibility can be
seen in the security and defense field. In the trade and regulatory
domain, by contrast, the EU-Swiss relationship is a “static”256 model that is out of favor with the EU and hence may not see replication elsewhere.
4.3. Turkey
A third model for association with the EU is embodied in the
EU-Turkey relationship. Turkey is not a member of EFTA or the
EEA, and it does not have a set of bilateral agreements providing
access to the internal market as is the case with Switzerland. Instead, the EU and Turkey concluded an association agreement in
1963,257 which has included a partial customs union since 1995.258
Turkey remains a candidate country to the EU, though its path to
membership appears long and full of obstacles in the current political climate.259
It would be a misconception to think that there is a single, allencompassing customs union of which the UK could remain a
255 See, e.g., Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement, Switz.-U.S., art. 3, ¶
2, Mar. 23–Dec. 6, 2001 (agreeing to provide “logistic support, supplies and services to the military forces of one Party by the other in return for either cash payment or the reciprocal provision of support … to the military forces of the other
Party.”). See also U.S. Dep’t of St., supra note 81, at 450–52 (listing bilateral treaties
in force between the U.S. and Switzerland as of January 1, 2018).
256
See HM GOVERNMENT, supra note 225, at 26 (maintaining that the EU’s
agreements with Switzerland are static in nature because while it does not have
Norway’s direct obligation to ensure its domestic law complies with certain EU
rules, the EU can still block it from accessing parts of the market if it fails to implement domestic legislation reflecting those rules).
257
See Agreement Creating an Association between the European Economic
Community and Turkey, Eur. Econ. Cmty.-Turk., Dec. 12, 1963, 96 U.N.T.S. 142.
258 See Decision No 1/95 of the EC-Turkey Association Council of 22 December 1995 on implementing the final phase of the Customs Union, Dec. 22, 1995,
1996 O.J. (L 35) 1.
259 See Ece Toksabay & Tulay Karadeniz, EU Parliament Calls for Turkey Accession
Talks
to
be
Suspended,
REUTERS
(July
6,
2017),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-eu-parliament/eu-parliament-callsfor-turkey-accession-talks-to-be-suspended-idUSKBN19R194
[https://perma.cc/79L2-2DHR] (discussing the tensions between the EU and
Turkey in light of the current political climate in Turkey).
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member even after it leaves the EU. Turkey is not in the customs
union that is the EU, but has a partial customs union with the EU,
which includes “industrial goods and processed agricultural
goods” but excludes “raw agricultural goods.”260
Regarding its external trade policy, the legal consequence of being in a customs union with the EU is that Turkey is committed to
aligning its tariff schedules with the EU’s common external tariff,
as far as is covered by their customs union,261 and to mimicking EU
trade agreements with third countries.262 The EU-Turkish customs
union, now considered “outdated,”263 gives Turkey little freedom,
as the country “has no involvement in decisions about the [EU’s]
Common External Tariff or setting the direction of the Common
Commercial Policy.”264 Moreover, it leaves Turkey disadvantaged,
as alignment does not mean that it will automatically “secure additional market access via EU FTAs with third countries, but these
third countries have access to Turkey’s market.”265 For instance,
Turkey has endeavored—unsuccessfully—to take part in negotiations between the EU and the U.S. over the TTIP.266
A proposed variation on a partial customs union is the socalled “Jersey model,” named after the British crown dependency
which entertains such a special arrangement with the EU. Under
such a model, “the UK remains in a comprehensive customs union
with the EU and the single market, but only for goods.” 267 On the
one hand, such a model would avoid border checks and in doing
so provide a solution for avoiding a hard border on the island of
Ireland. On the other hand, it would severely restrict the scope of
maneuver of the UK’s post-Brexit trade policy, essentially limiting
it to services-only trade agreements with third countries.
See van der Wel & Wessel, supra note 218, at 71.
See Decision No 1/95 96/142/EC of the EC-Turkey Association Council,
supra note 258, at art. 13.
262 Id. at art. 16, ¶ 1 (“… Turkey will take the necessary measures and negotiate agreements on mutually advantageous basis with the countries concerned.”).
263 See Van der Wel & Wessel, supra note 218, at 71.
264 House of Lords, European Union Committee, Brexit: The Options for Trade,
5th Report of Session 2016–17, HL Paper 72 (Dec. 13, 2016),
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201617/ldselect/ldeucom/72/72.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3S2J-CE3M].
265 Id.
266 See van der Wel & Wessel, supra note 218, at 72.
267
See John Springford & Sam Lowe, Holding out Hope for a Half-Way Brexit
House, CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN REFORM BULLETIN NO. 118, 2 (Feb./Mar. 2018),
https://www.cer.eu/sites/default/files/bulletin_118_js-sl_article2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VT9D-ET34].
260
261
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In the area of security and defense, as with Norway and Switzerland, Turkey remains free to conduct its own policy. It is a
NATO member, has contributed to CSDP operations, and has concluded a framework agreement with the EU to that effect.268 Turkey has a range of treaties in the defense field with the U.S. as
well,269 but no comprehensive, modern trade agreement.270 As an
EU candidate country, Turkey occasionally aligns itself with the
EU in international fora.271
In sum, in the areas of security and defense, also in the case of
Turkey, the transatlantic triangle is very flexible and has allowed
the country to cooperate closely both with the U.S. and the EU. In
the trade and regulatory field, the constraints imposed by Turkey’s
association with the EU only cover certain sectors. However, they
weigh heavily due to the obligation of alignment without voting
rights and without automatic economic benefits in return.
4.4. Canada
Deep and comprehensive trade agreements represent a more
hands-off approach to association with the EU than the models
outlined above. Nonetheless, they aim to provide “increased market access and regulatory convergence.”272 The current “gold
standard,” in the EU’s eyes,273 is embodied in the Comprehensive
Economic and Trade Agreement between the EU and Canada
268
See Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey
Establishing a Framework for the Participation of the Republic of Turkey in the
European Union Crisis Management Operations, June 29, 2006, 2006 O.J. (L 189)
17 (setting forth the conditions under which Turkey would be invited to contribute to EU crisis management). See also Tardy, supra note 140, at 3 (listing seven
CSDP missions to which Turkey contributed).
269 See U.S. Dep’t of St., supra note 81, at 467–68 (listing twenty-three defense
treaties in force between the United States and Turkey).
270
See Id. at 471 (noting the existence of an investment protection agreement
signed in Washington, Dec. 3, 1985).
271
See Kemppainen, supra note 235 (stating Turkey’s alignment with the European Union’s General Statement concerning the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty).
272 See van der Wel & Wessel, supra note 218, at 72.
273 See European Commission Statement 16/446, Joint statement: Canada-EU
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), Feb. 29, 2016,
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-16-446_en.htm
[https://perma.cc/6BE2-9M6H] (announcing the completion of the legal review
of the CETA).
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(CETA), which was signed on October 30, 2016. It is not yet in
force, since as a mixed agreement it requires ratification by Canada, the EU, and all of its Member States,274 which highlights the
continued importance of the latter in this particular transatlantic
triangle. CETA has been provisionally applied since September
2017.275 Moreover, an opinion has been requested from the CJEU
to determine whether CETA, in particular its chapter on institutionalized investment protection, is compatible with the EU Treaties.276 Hence, ratification of such an advanced FTA is drawn out
while legal uncertainty persists.
CETA “phases out the tariffs on 98% of all goods and addresses
several other discriminatory measures such as subsidies and quotas,”277 but still maintains tariffs in some limited cases such as with
fishery and agricultural products.278 Moreover, CETA guarantees
geographical indications and opens public procurement markets.279
Furthermore, it establishes a sophisticated institutional setup, including a Joint Committee, inter-party arbitration, an Investment
Court System (ICS), and a Regulatory Cooperation Forum.280
While it is innovative in that it maintains a “negative list” approach to services, this still means that some sectors remain excluded, such as audio-visual services and public services in the arSee CETA, supra note 108, at art. 30.7, ¶ 2.
See Council Decision (EU) 2017/38 of 28 October 2016 on the Provisional
Application of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) Between Canada, of the One Part, and the European Union and its Member States, of
the Other Part, 2017, O.J. (L 11) 1080, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32017D0038&from=EN
[https://perma.cc/Z258-ZXDB] (including the exact date which was jointly announced). See also European Commission Statement 17/1959, EU and Canada
agree to set a date for the provisional application of the Comprehensive Economic
and Trade Agreement, July 8, 2017, http://europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease_STATEMENT-17-1959_en.htm
[https://perma.cc/FHH5-FE8Q]
(announcing the date of provisional application as September 21, 2017).
276
See Opinion 1/17, Request for an opinion submitted by the Kingdom of
Belgium pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU, 2017 O.J. (C 369) 2.
277 See van der Wel & Wessel, supra note 218, at 72.
278 Id.
279 See CETA, supra note 108, at ch. 19 (on government procurement) and ch.
20, section B, sub-section C (on geographical indications).
280 Id. at art. 26.1 (on the Joint Committee), ch. 29 (on inter-party disputes), ch.
8, section F (on investment disputes), and art. 21.6 (on the Regulatory Cooperation Forum). The new investment court system is not covered by provisional application, see Council Decision (EU) 2017/38, supra note 275, at art. 1(a) (noting it
does not include the CETA provisions which make up section F on the “Resolution of investment disputes between investors and states.”).
274
275
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eas of health, education, and social protection.281 In terms of
providing market access for financial services, it is a far cry from
passporting rights that EU members enjoy. In this domain, CETA
offers not much more than what exists under the terms of the multilateral General Agreements on Trade in Services (GATS) already.
This means “Canadian companies have to establish a subsidiary in
the EU in order to be able to sell their financial services.”282
Being an FTA with no customs union, Canada remains free to
adjust its tariff schedules (as far as its WTO schedules allow) with
the non-EU world. Moreover, it can conclude trade agreements
with third countries. CETA and the additional Joint Interpretative
Statement repeatedly stress the “right to regulate.”283 This implies
regulatory freedom rather than restraint in Canada’s external trade
policy. However, while regulatory compliance with EU standards
is not a legal requirement, it remains an economic necessity if Canada wants to be able to export its goods and services to the EU.284
Unlike Norway, Switzerland, and Turkey, Canada has a free trade
agreement with the U.S. in the form of NAFTA (currently in the
process of being revamped as the USMCA), of which Mexico is also a party.285 Thanks to CETA and NAFTA, Canada is an example
of a country with wide-ranging market access covered by FTAs
with both the EU and the U.S. However, important limits apply to
such access, while NAFTA is currently being renegotiated at the
request of the Trump Administration.286
281
See van der Wel & Wessel, supra note 217, at 72 (listing a few major service sectors which are not included); see also Dominic Webb, CETA: The EU-Canada
Free Trade Agreement, UK House of Commons Library Briefing Paper No. 7492
(Sept.
12,
2017),
at
11,
https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP7492#fullreport [https://perma.cc/3NG2-J57T] (listing the public services which
were excluded from CETA).
282 See van der Wel & Wessel, supra note 217, at 73.
283
See CETA, supra note 108, at art. 8.9, ¶ 1, art. 23.2, art. 23.4. See also Joint
Interpretative Instrument on the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
(CETA) between Canada and the European Union and its Member States, Can.EU, Oct. 27, 2016, 2016 O.J. (L 11) 3, pts. 1(e), 3, 6(a).
284 See van der Wel & Wessel, supra note 217, at 73 (“Besides compliance with
EU rules and standards when exporting goods to the EU, Canada does not have to
incorporate any EU legislation within its domestic legislation.”).
285
See U.S. Dep’t of St., supra note 81, at 64–78 (overviewing the bilateral
agreements between Canada and the U.S.).
286
See, U.S. Office of the Trade Representative, Summary of Objectives for
the
NAFTA
Renegotiation
(July
17,
2017),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Releases/NAFTAObjectives.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V8KF-TXEM] (announcing the renegotiation of NAFTA at the
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In the area of security and defense, it is noteworthy that CETA
is accompanied by a Strategic Partnership Agreement between
Canada and the EU.287 The language of the latter is rather hortatory, and leaves Canada as free as the countries in the examples
above. For instance, the agreement stresses common international
commitments, ranging from human rights288 to the International
Criminal Court,289 and establishes a political dialogue and consultative mechanism.290 In addition and prior to the 2016 Strategic
Partnership Agreement, Canada concluded a framework agreement with the EU on taking part in CSDP operations,291 and contributed to several of these operations over the years.292 Like Norway, Canada is a NATO member and also has numerous bilateral
treaties with the U.S. in the field of defense.293 Hence, in the security and defense field, Canada is able to entertain simultaneous cooperation arrangements with both the EU and the U.S.
Canada’s example shows legal commitments with a large degree of flexibility in both the trade and security dimensions of its
relationship with both the EU and U.S. Nevertheless, in order to
benefit from the significant but nonetheless limited market access
granted by CETA, Canada needs to comply with relevant EU legislation and regulation.

behest of President Trump).
287 See Strategic Partnership Agreement between the European Union and its
Member States, of the One Part, and Canada, of the Other Part, EU-Can., Oct. 30,
2016,
2016
O.J.
(L
329)
45,
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:22016A1203(03)&qid=1536962793825&from=E
N [https://perma.cc/DM9N-96MY].
288 Id. at art. 2.
289 Id. at art. 5.
290 Id. at arts. 26 and 27.
291
See Agreement between the European Union and Canada Establishing a
Framework for the Participation of Canada in the European Union Crisis Management Operations, EU-Can., Nov. 24, 2005, 2005 O.J. (L 315) 21, https://eurlex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:22005A1201(01)&qid=1536962972715&from=E
N [https://perma.cc/M928-JV2B] (enumerating the conditions under which the
EU may invite Canada into its crisis management operations).
292
See Tardy, supra note 140, at 3 (listing Canadian contributions to CSDP
operations).
293
See U.S. Dep’t of St., supra note 81, at 64–78 (listing bilateral treaties between Canada and the United States).
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4.5. “No Deal”
Another option, though not really a “model,” is that the EU
and UK will fail to agree on a future agreement which would closely associate them with each other. In the trade realm, such a “no
deal” scenario would lead to their trade relationship falling back
onto WTO rules, including the application of tariffs in certain areas
and limits in terms of access to the EU internal market, especially
in the area of services.294 According to economic modelling by
RAND Europe in 2017, such a scenario would result in reducing
the UK’s “future GDP (compared to full EU membership) by about
4.9 per cent, or $140bn, over 10 years.”295 For the EU, according to
this estimate, the loss in GDP “would be relatively minor, about 0.7
per cent of GDP.”296 In the words of Gormley, such a scenario
“would be a hard Brexit on the most disadvantageous terms for all
parties.”297 Nonetheless, a “no deal” Brexit on WTO terms has
been vigorously advocated by some prominent British politicians.298
Such an outcome would leave the UK free to conclude trade
agreements with other countries and to determine its own tariffs
and regulations (in accordance with WTO rules). However, the UK
would still need to comply with relevant EU laws and regulations
to be able to export to the EU’s internal market even under the
WTO framework.299
In the field of security and defense, “no deal” would mean not
following up the UK’s ejection from the CFSP/CSDP with a future
294
See van der Wel & Wessel, supra note 217, at 75–76 (“Furthermore, the
WTO option would significantly limit the UK’s access to the services market.”).
295
CHARLES P. RIES ET AL., RAND EUROPE, AFTER BREXIT ALTERNATE FORMS OF
BREXIT AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE EUROPEAN UNION
AND THE UNITED STATEs xi–xii (2017) (internal footnotes omitted). This scenario
does not assume that the UK concludes an FTA with the U.S.
296 Id.
297
Laurence W. Gormley, Brexit—Nevermind the Whys and Wherefores? Fog in
the Channel, Continent Cut off!, 40 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1175, 1206 (2017).
298
See Iain Duncan Smith, Sorry, Project Fear, We are Not Going to Fall off a
Cliff-Edge – Britain will Thrive, DAILY TELEGRAPH (Aug. 15, 2018),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2018/08/15/sorry-project-fear-not-goingfall-cliff-edge-britain-will/ [https://perma.cc/5WT8-RSNN] (making the case for
“no deal,” and accepting the terms of the WTO over another deal with the EU).
299
See CHARLES P. RIES ET AL., supra note 295, at xi (noting that under a “no
deal” scenario, the “UK would be able to set its own tariffs and establish its own
regulatory standards, although any divergence from EU standards would increase
non-tariff barriers (NTBs).”).
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arrangement to contribute as a third country, such as the framework agreements of Norway and Canada. However, the UK
would remain connected to 22 EU Member States via its continued
NATO membership, and hence indirectly to the EU via EU-NATO
cooperation (see supra 3.3.2).
In addition, as these different models reveal, the way security
and defense cooperation and third country participation are structured in the EU, this policy domain is far less restrictive than cooperation with third countries in trade and regulatory matters. For
instance, neither neutrality nor NATO membership preclude contributing to CSDP operations conducted by the EU, nor do they
preclude (parallel) cooperation on a bilateral basis with individual
EU members. The EU’s CFSP/CDSP hardly clouds these relationships. By contrast, close association with the EU through either a
customs union or EEA membership puts significant restraints on
an independent trade policy. It is here that the shadow of the EUMember States side of the triangle looms largest over its relations
with third countries. In the case of deep FTAs such as CETA, the
“right to regulate” applied to both sides of the agreement. They
suggest leeway, but at the same time legally cement the need for
compliance with evolving EU standards to benefit from market access under such an FTA. Thus, the third country still remains in
the penumbra of the internal market. This fundamental difference
between trade and security and the more rigid trade-offs that exist
in the former field together form key factors in the development of
the “new transatlantic trigonometry” post-Brexit.
5. NEW TRANSATLANTIC TRIGONOMETRY
While the previous sections were about the situation pre-Brexit
and alternative models of association with the EU that exist with
other countries, the analysis now turns to a future in which the UK
has ceased to be an EU member. In particular, it addresses what
this will entail for legal relations with the U.S. The good news
from a transatlantic point of view is that the vast majority of triangular treaty relations the U.S. entertains with the EU and its Member States will remain unaffected by Brexit. However, the EU itself
did not freeze up in a state of paralysis after the Brexit referendum.
To the contrary, it has been moving ahead in its external relations,
both with internal reforms and new approaches to international
agreements. This situation represents a double challenge: first,
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Brexit calls into question the UK’s position regarding the existing
bilateral and multilateral EU-agreements with the U.S.; second, beyond maintaining continuity, future treaty relations between the
U.S. and UK will be conditioned by the form of the future relationship the latter will have with the EU. The UK may be out of the
EU, but the closer an association with the EU it desires, the more it
will remain part of this triangular relationship when engaging with
non-EU countries.
The crux will not necessarily lie in the quantity of agreements
to be renegotiated here, but in the qualitatively relevant ones. The
lesson from the previous sections applies here: It is the economic,
“low politics” agreements that will be most legally and politically
challenging, while a transatlantic readjustment in the “high politics” of security and defense will be a lot more straightforward by
comparison. To elaborate on these points, the final section of this
Article first catches up with the intervening developments in the
EU and explains their relevance in the transatlantic context (5.1.)
and addresses important timing issues for the way forward (5.2.).
Subsequently, it turns to the future of the U.S.-EU-UK triangle, first
from the point of view of continuity (5.3.) and then moving on to
future agreements (5.4.).
5.1. The EU as a Moving Target
Trade and security not only serve as useful examples for distinguishing different modes of managing Brexit in the transatlantic
relationship. They also showcase the activities undertaken within
the EU to readjust its foreign relations moving forward.
That Brexit represented an existential challenge for the EU became clear in the context of the finalization of the EU’s Global
Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy in June 2016. The Global
Strategy, which covers all areas of EU external relations, was approved only a few days after the EU membership referendum in
the UK. Hence, its authors felt compelled to make a direct reference to it. In the Strategy’s foreword, High Representative Federica Mogherini observed that the “purpose, even existence, of our
Union is being questioned”300 noting that this “is even more true
after the British referendum.”301
In the area of trade, the EU has continued to push ahead with
300
301

SHARED VISION, COMMON ACTION: A STRONGER EUROPE, supra note 55, at 3.
Id.
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bilateral negotiations with, among others, Canada, Japan, Mercosur, Mexico, and Vietnam.302 The above-mentioned Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement with Canada was signed in
October 2016 and is being provisionally applied (supra 4.4.). Even
though CETA was hailed as the new “gold standard” of its
FTAs,303 the protracted ratification process and questions about the
legality of its Investment Court System has prompted a fine-tuning
of the EU’s approach to trade agreements elsewhere.
The clearest manifestation of this new approach is the forthcoming EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (“EPA”). Negotiations on it were finalized in December 2017. A remarkable
new feature is the splitting of the originally envisaged EPA into
two parts—one falling under the EU’s exclusive competence; the
other including “shared” elements such as investment protection,
on which negotiations continue.304 This has an important consequence from the point of view of EU foreign relations law: for the
EU-exclusive agreement, ratification by all Member States can thus
be avoided.
From a transatlantic relations perspective, CETA and the EPA
with Japan send two different signals regarding the prospects of a
TTIP—or any successor initiative. On the one hand, if hailing
CETA as the EU’s new “gold standard” means that it will be the
substantive baseline for future negotiations, this will make finding
common ground with the U.S. even harder. In particular, not only
the heavily institutionalized Investment Court System,305 but also
issues such as guaranteeing geographical indications and the open302 See Jakob Hanke, EU Takes Over Global Trade Stage, POLITICO (Dec. 8, 2017),
https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-takes-over-global-trade-stage/
[https://perma.cc/D7E4-F2RJ] (discussing numerous trade deals the EU is currently pursuing).
303 See European Commission Statement 16/446, supra note 273.
304
See European Commission, EU News 267/2017 Joint Statement by the
President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker and the Prime Minister
of
Japan
Shinzo
Abe
(Dec.
8,
2017),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1768
[https://perma.cc/MKN2-AKVJ] (noting that negotiations are ongoing).
305
The U.S. administration is said to be pursuing an aggressive approach
towards the WTO’s Appellate Body. See Gregory Schaffer, The Slow Killing of the
World
Trade
Organization,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Nov.
17,
2017),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/the-slow-killing-of-the-world-tradeorganization_us_5a0ccd1de4b03fe7403f82df
[https://perma.cc/HCD2-FDQG]
(detailing the Trump Administration’s plans to effectively destroy the WTO by
blocking appointments to its Appellate Body, which may reflect a general skepticism towards international adjudicatory bodies with jurisdiction over the U.S.).
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ing of public procurement markets will be hard to swallow for U.S.
negotiators.306
On the other hand, the “splitting” approach as seen in the EPA
with Japan makes it considerably easier to ratify the EU-exclusive
agreement on the EU side. Moreover, it removes the investment
protection chapter and its institutional architecture, which is still
politically and legally contentious,307 from the immediate agenda
for both sides. In any event, it is unlikely that the U.S., as an economic superpower outweighing the EU post-Brexit,308 will keenly
work from any EU blueprint.
Turning to security and defense, the EU has made this a priority area of implementing its 2016 Global Strategy. Even though the
UK under the Blair government played a crucial role in unlocking
the CSDP in the late 1990s (see supra 2.1.), subsequent UK governments blocked efforts for more integrated structures or institutions
such as a common operational headquarters.309 However, with the
withdrawal process officially launched, reforms in EU defense policy have started to gain traction.310
306
See DANIEL S. HAMILTON, CREATING A NORTH ATLANTIC MARKETPLACE FOR
JOBS AND GROWTH: THREE PATHS, ONE DETOUR, A U-TURN, AND THE ROAD TO
NOWHERE 14 (2018) (noting that “Washington was unwilling (and largely unable)
to open public procurement, or compromise on geographical indications, two
primary goals for the Europeans.”).
307
See Robert W. Schwieder, TTIP and the Investment Court System: A New
(and Improved) Paradigm for Investor-State Adjudication, 55 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
178, 226 (2016) (discussing the different critiques on investor-state dispute settlement and concluding that although “incorporating an updated and reformed
ISDS system into the TTIP agreement theoretically presents the best available alternative to the current regime, only a miraculous shift in public perception
would render that option practicable”). See also, HAMILTON, supra note 306, at 14.
308
See Josh Zumbrum, Brexit Will Put the U.S. Back atop the World GDP RankSTREET
JOURNAL
(June
29,
2016),
ings,
WALL
https://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2016/06/29/brexit-will-put-the-u-s-backatop-the-world-gdp-rankings/ [https://perma.cc/62DL-DGYJ] (discussing the
macroeconomic consequences and concomitant effects on EU-U.S. trade negotiations of Brexit).
309
See Hajnalka Vincze, The Transatlantic Dimension of Euroscepticism, in THE
UK CHALLENGE TO EUROPEANIZATION: THE PERSISTENCE OF BRITISH EUROSCEPTICISM
232, 240–41 (Karine Tournier-Sol & Chris Gifford eds., 2015) (discussing UK opposition to integration with EU security and defense initiatives). This opposition also continued after the Brexit referendum. See also Andrew Rettmann, UK Blocks
Blueprint for EU Military HQ, EU OBSERVER (May 16, 2017),
https://euobserver.com/foreign/137916 [https://perma.cc/DKG8-SFES] (discussing the UK’s efforts to block the establishment of an EU military headquarters
after the Brexit vote).
310
Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on Implementing
the EU Global Strategy in the Area of Security and Defence, Brussels, Nov. 14,
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Three developments are illustrative of this trend. First, a “Military Planning and Conduct Capability”—an EU headquarters but
only for “non-executive” missions, i.e., those concerned with training—was established in June 2017.311 Second, the European Commission successfully initiated a new “European Defence Fund” to
the order of 5.5 billion euros per year.312 This initiative is relevant
in that it starts to blur the line between the supranational and intergovernmental modes of operation in EU external relations by
giving defense a more prominent role in the regular EU budget.313
This entails more involvement of the European Parliament and
Commission,314 which are traditionally structurally sidelined in the
CFSP/CSDP. Moreover, it moves the EU towards becoming a
closer and more active military procurement market, which should
be of economic interest to U.S. defense industry and, hence, also
the U.S. government’s trade policy.
Third, a framework called “Permanent Structured Cooperation” (PESCO) has been activated. Provided for in the EU Treaties
following the Lisbon reform,315 the provisions on PESCO laid
dormant for eight years. In late 2017, it was officially launched.316
It allows a group of Member States to work together more closely
2016,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/22459/eugs-conclusionsst14149en16.pdf) [https://perma.cc/QS36-G7LX].
311
Council Decision (EU) 2017/971 of 8 June 2017 determining the planning
and conduct arrangements for EU non-executive military CSDP missions and
amending Decisions 2010/96/CFSP on a European Union military mission to contribute to the training of Somali security forces, 2013/34/CFSP on a European Union military mission to contribute to the training of the Malian armed forces
(EUTM Mali) and (CFSP) 2016/610 on a European Union CSDP military training
mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM RCA), 2018 O.J. (L 146) 133.
312
European Commission, Press Release IP/17/1508, A European Defence
Fund: €5.5 Billion per Year to Boost Europe’s Defence Capabilities (June 7, 2017).
313
Id. (“The Fund will create incentives for Member States to cooperate on
joint development and the acquisition of defence equipment and technology
through co-financing from the EU budget and practical support from the Commission.”).
314
See TFEU, supra note 28, at art. 314 (establishing the involvement of the
Commission, Council, and Parliament in the adoption of the EU’s annual budget).
See also supra 2.3.
315
See TEU, supra note 28, at art. 46; see also TEU, supra note 28, Protocol No.
10 (discussing permanent structured cooperation established by Article 42 of the
Treaty on European Union, attached to the EU Treaties).
316
See Notification on Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) to the
Council and to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy,
Nov.
13,
2017,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/31511/171113-pesco-notification.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HV8G-F56D] (announcing the initiation of PESCO).
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in the creation of military capabilities and their deployment in order to conduct “the most demanding missions.”317 Among the 25
PESCO countries, voting requirements on certain matters switches
from unanimity to qualified majority.318 Hence deviation—though
a slight one—from the intergovernmental mode of operation can
be seen here as well. All EU Member States except Denmark, Malta, and the UK take part in PESCO.319 Since the latter is assumed to
be leaving the EU, it did not sign up.320
A way back in for the UK is that PESCO allows for thirdcountry participation. However, interested third countries “would
need to provide substantial added value to the project, contribute
to strengthening PESCO and the CSDP, and meet more demanding
commitments.”321 As is the case with contributing to CSDP operations, the EU “will not grant decision powers to such Third States
in the governance of PESCO.”322 Admission to PESCO will be
granted by the Council “in PESCO format” after checking “if the
conditions set out in the general arrangements are met.”323 If admitted, “the participating Member States taking part in a project
may enter into administrative arrangements with the third State
concerned.”324 Hence, next to a framework agreement for the UK’s
participation in PESCO, there would be additional “soft” agreements between the UK and EU countries that take part in PESCO.
From a transatlantic perspective, this would in theory also allow the U.S. to take part in PESCO. However, for the time being
PESCO as well as the European Defence Fund should be seen from
the perspective of EU-NATO relations. Both have the potential to
TEU, supra note 28, at art. 42, ¶ 6.
See TEU, supra note 28, at art. 46, ¶ 2 (concerning the establishment of
PESCO); see also, TEU, supra note 28, art. 46, ¶ 3 (concerning the admission of
Member States to PESCO at a later stage); see TEU, supra note 28, at art. 46, ¶ 4
(concerning the suspension of underperforming participating Member States).
319
See Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 of 11 December 2017, 2017 O.J. (L
331) 57, art. 2 (establishing permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and determining the list of participating Member States).
320 See Andrea Shalal & Robert Emmott, EU to Sign Joint Defense Pact in Show
of post-Brexit Unity, REUTERS (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/useu-defence/eu-to-sign-joint-defense-pact-in-show-of-post-brexit-unityidUSKBN1D81CT [https://perma.cc/U9SW-9E2U] (“But it was clear that Britain,
which intends to leave the bloc following the Brexit referendum of June 2016,
would not participate, officials said.”).
321 See Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315, supra note 319, Annex III, pt. 2.2.1.
322 Id.
323 Id.
324 Id., art. 9, ¶ 3.
317
318
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be seen as tangible steps towards increased and more efficient defense spending among European NATO members, a contentious
point highlighted by the current administration.325 At the same
time, none of these initiatives have a direct, legally relevant impact
on NATO, although better EU-NATO cooperation has been exhorted as desirable by the leadership of both organizations.326
Across different policies, the EU is changing its approach towards external relations. These changes affect both the procedures
for, and content of, international treaties with third countries going
forward, including with the U.S. and the post-Brexit UK.
5.2. Timing Issues
Before turning to the substantive issues of (re-)negotiating treaties with the U.S., two preliminary points need to be made concerning timing. Firstly, as long as the UK remains a member of the EU,
it will be covered by, and bound by, the treaties that the EU concludes.327
Once the UK ceases to be an EU member, it may enter a transitional phase with the EU. Such an arrangement has been flagged
as desirable by the UK government.328 Also, the EU has indicated
325
See Peter Baker, Trump Says NATO Allies Don’t Pay Their Share. Is That
TIMES
(May
26,
2017),
True?,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/26/world/europe/nato-trumpspending.html [https://perma.cc/NJ7U-Z8JF] (discussing President Trump’s
claim that European NATO members are failing to contribute enough to defense
spending).
326
See, e.g., the Joint Declaration by the President of the European Council,
the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the
North
Atlantic
Treaty
Organization,
Warsaw,
July
8,
2016,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/31947/st14802en17.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TDY5-2S8S] (committing “to give new impetus and new substance to the NATO-EU strategic partnership”). See also Council of the European
Union, Council Conclusions on the Implementation of the Joint Declaration by the
President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission
and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Brussels,
Dec. 5, 2017 (announcing the intention of the European Union, European Commission, and NATO to enhance strategic cooperation on security and defense).
327
See TFEU, supra note 28, at art. 216, ¶ 2 (“Agreements concluded by the
Union are binding upon the institutions of the Union and on its Member States.”).
328 See Prime Minister’s Office, PM’s Florence speech: A New Era of Cooperation and Partnership between the UK and the EU (Sept. 22, 2017),
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-florence-speech-a-new-era-ofcooperation-and-partnership-between-the-uk-and-the-eu
[https://perma.cc/3XZX-JED2] (suggesting “an implementation period of around
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an interest for a transition period, though under the premise that
“the United Kingdom will continue to participate in the Customs
Union and the Single Market (with all four freedoms) during the
transition.”329 This arrangement would entail, among other things,
that the UK “will have to continue to comply with EU trade policy” and apply the EU’s customs tariffs.330 According to the supplementary negotiating directives of January 2018, moreover, “the
United Kingdom should remain bound by the obligations stemming from” EU agreements but will “no longer participate in any
bodies set up by those agreements.”331
Nevertheless, from a transatlantic perspective, any transitional
arrangement is an agreement between the EU and UK, and thus,
res inter alios acta as far as the U.S. is concerned. The EU and UK
cannot together agree that the UK will emerge as a new quasiparty to existing EU treaties with third countries where the UK
was not a party before (i.e., non-mixed agreements, supra 3.2.).
Such “roll-over” during the transition would require the consent of
the other parties,332 including the U.S., in each case, following the
logic of the law of treaties discussed below. With the presumptive
Brexit date of March 29, 2019 looming, this leaves relatively little
time for preparing the negotiation of such consent with the United
States and others. Nevertheless, assuming the transition is limited
in time and will not become entirely open-ended, this is likely to
raise the chances for approval from the American side. The U.S.
may then save its demands for concessions and adaptations for the
post-transition period.
The approaching Brexit deadline leads to the second preliminary point, i.e., the question of when the UK can start negotiating
new treaties with the U.S., either to replace existing ones (posttransition) or to tread new ground. Politically, it would make
sense for the UK to commence as soon as possible, even while it is
two years.”).
329 European Council, supra note 42, at 2.
330 Id.
331
Council of the European Union, supra note 44, at pt. 15. See also Draft
Agreement on the Withdrawal of the United Kingdom, supra note 45, at art. 129,
¶¶ 1–2.
332
Ramses A. Wessel, Consequences of Brexit for International Agreements Concluded by the EU and its Member States, 55 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 101, 116 (2018)
(noting that the UK “may in some cases aim at what could largely be a copy of the
agreements that were concluded by the EU. This, of course, assumes that the other contracting parties would agree to such a solution. In fact, this should not be
taken as a given.”).
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still an EU member. However, legally, the UK is barred from negotiating international agreements on its own in cases where they
touch upon EU exclusive competences, where EU rules may be affected, or where the “duty of sincere cooperation” might be violated (supra 3.3.). Here, the triangular relationship comes to the fore
again, as the UK remains conditioned in its international dealing
until the end of its EU membership. During a transition period,
this side of the triangle would change in nature from EU law to international law. Nonetheless, significant restrictions are likely to
apply then as well. According to the supplementary EU directives,
the UK “may not become bound by international agreements entered into in its own capacity in the fields of competence of Union
law, unless authorized to do so by the Union.”333 However, at least
this opens the possibility for the UK to start negotiations during
the transition. In October 2017, the UK government had acknowledged that it “would not bring into effect any new arrangements
with third countries which were not consistent with the terms of
[its transitional] agreement with the EU.”334
It would be legally possible, and politically advisable, for the
EU to authorize the UK to start negotiations with third countries as
soon as possible,335 definitely during the transition. While still an
EU member, the UK government has been careful to brand its talks
with third parties as “preliminary discussions” rather than negotiations.336 With the United States in particular, it has set up a “trade
and investment working group.”337 A core task of this group’s
work will be to ensure the continuity of treaty relations and explore future agreements. As its name suggests, the focus is on economic issues rather than security and defense.
333
See Council of the European Union, supra note 44, at pt. 16. See also Draft
Agreement on the Withdrawal of the United Kingdom, supra note 45, at art. 129, ¶
4.
334
UK DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE, PREPARING FOR OUR FUTURE
UK TRADE POLICY, 2017, Cm. 9470, at 28.
335 Thomas Streinz, Cooperative Brexit: Giving back Control over Trade Policy, 15
INT’L J. CONST’L L. 271, 284–87 (2017); see also TFEU, supra note 28, at art. 2, ¶ 1.
336
Theresa May: UK will Lead World in Free Trade, BBC (Sept. 7, 2016),
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-37291832
[https://perma.cc/K4PSTDX4].
337 UK DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, US-UK TRADE WORKING GROUP
LAYS GROUNDWORK FOR POTENTIAL FUTURE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (July 25, 2017),
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/us-uk-trade-working-group-laysgroundwork-for-potential-future-free-trade-agreement [https://perma.cc/ZN6REBSY].
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5.3. Ensuring Continuity in Treaty Relationships
There are various parallel ongoing developments in the transatlantic triangle, i.e., Brexit negotiations, EU reforms, as well as a
generally perceived unpredictability of the new U.S. administration.338 Hence, a legal analysis on the way forward needs to start
with the issue of ensuring “continuity” of existing relationships
despite the potential for disruption inherent in the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. The focus will be on the post-transitional period,
though it should be noted that also for the continuing application
of EU-agreements with the U.S. during a transition phase, the latter’s consent would be needed. First, bilateral agreements will be
discussed, followed by the multilateral ones. Within each category
it makes sense to distinguish again between non-mixed and mixed
agreements.
“Continuity” of existing agreements has been noted as an objective of the UK government.339 As to what it means by “rolling
over” existing agreements concluded by the EU beyond a transition period, domestic discussion for a new “Trade Bill” provides
some clarification. 340 According to a House of Commons briefing
paper, “[i]nstead of seeking to become a party to existing EU trade
agreements in the long term (sometimes called ‘trilateralisation’),
the Government’s approach is to negotiate new bilateral agreements with the third countries that are ‘substantively the same or
as similar as possible.’”341 This may be an optimistic assessment,
particularly when dealing with the United States.
In the case of the U.S., there is no existing comprehensive bilateral trade agreement given the freezing of TTIP negotiations. Nevertheless, many of the approximately 50 bilateral agreements in
338
See, e.g., Keren Yarhi-Milo, After Credibility: American Foreign Policy in the
Trump Era, 97 FOREIGN AFF. 68, 72 (2018) (“Yet the president’s track record of flipflopping on key campaign pledges, his bizarre and inaccurate outbursts on Twitter, his exaggerated threats, and his off-the-cuff assurances have all led observers
to seriously doubt his words.”).
339
UK DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 334, at 28 (“The
UK Government is committed to seeking continuity in its current trade and investment relationships, including those covered by EU third country FTAs and
other EU preferential arrangements.”).
340 Lorna Booth et al., The Trade Bill, House of Commons Library Briefing Paper (July 2, 2018), at 31 (explaining that the new legislation is to give “the Government powers to change domestic legislation to ensure that any such ‘transitioned’ trade agreements can be implemented.”).
341 Id. at 29–30.
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force between the EU and U.S. have a trade or trade-related dimension,342 and hence would need to be replicated.343 Moreover,
there are several other agreements, beyond the scope of the “Trade
Bill”, including in the field of security, where there is little clarity
about whether they are to be “rolled over” or not.344 Yet in other
cases, such as air transport, “suspended” agreements may reactivate themselves even though they might be outdated.345
From a UK foreign relations law point of view, the conclusion
of “roll over” agreements is fairly uncontroversial for three reasons. First, the UK is already complying with them while still an
EU member. Second, treaties are made by the British government
under the “royal prerogative,” leaving Parliament only limited
powers of prior scrutiny.346 Third, government powers for ensuring continuity are further bolstered through special legislation,
such as the above-mentioned Trade Bill. However, there are possible hurdles on the U.S. side.
The EU-only bilateral agreements in force with the U.S. cease to
apply to the UK post-Brexit.347 Hence, “roll-over” is a somewhat
euphemistic term, describing what under the international law of
treaties amounts to the conclusion of new agreements with the U.S.
Neither the replication of the content in the new agreement nor the
other party’s consent can be presumed, the latter being regulated
by American foreign relations law. This required, in any event, the
President’s approval.348 Depending on the subject matter, it will
342
Agreement between the United States of America and the European
Community on Trade in Wine, U.S.-EU, Mar. 10, 2006, T.I.A.S. 05-1123.
343 E.g., Agreement between the Government of the United States of America
and the European Union on the Coordination of Energy-Efficiency Labelling Programs for Office Equipment, U.S.-EU, Jan. 18, 2013, T.I.A.S. 13-220.
344
For instance, there exists a U.S.-UK agreement in parallel to the U.S.-EU
one. See Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on
Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, U.S.-UK-N. Ir., Jan. 6, 1994, T.I.A.S.
96-1202 (rendering, potentially, the replication of the EU-U.S. agreement unnecessary).
345
Agreement on Air Transport Services, supra note 204 (showing that the
suspended U.S.-UK Agreement on North Atlantic Air Fares stems from 1978).
346
See Miller, supra note 35, at ¶¶ 54–58 (summarizing the UK’s dualist system, with reference to case law and convention). See also CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN,
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 129 (2014) (concluding that “the process of negotiation,
conclusion and signature of treaties remains with the executive, as indeed does
their ratification on the international place.”).
347
See e.g., Odermatt, supra note 49, at 1056; Łazowski & Wessel, supra note
47, at 13.
348
Some agreements may be, and increasingly are, concluded as executive
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also require different forms of Congressional involvement.349 From
a continuity point of view, a logical starting point for procedural
clarity is, hence, to check under which procedure in U.S. law relevant agreements were concluded with the EU in the first place.
Moreover, the case of dealing with the U.S. might be distinguished from most of the many dozen continuity negotiations that
await the post-Brexit UK. On the one hand, there is the oftinvoked “special relationship,”350 which may imply a degree of
goodwill towards the UK. On the other, any “special relationship”
bonus may be mitigated by several factors. In contrast to smaller,
especially developing countries, the United States has the administrative capacity, negotiating experience, and considerable economic and political leverage to check closely whether it is in the country’s interest to simply “roll over” an agreement, or whether its
content should be adapted given the new political and economic
reality. Most importantly, the contracting party is no longer the
whole EU and its internal market, but one country with an economy—though sizeable—amounting to one sixth of the EU’s gross
domestic product (GDP).351 In particular, this would involve
checking whether any concessions were given to the EU at the
time, which would no longer seem merited vis-à-vis the UK.352
Such an approach would be consistent with the current administraagreements by the President alone. See Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power over
International Law: Restoring the Balance, 119 YALE L. J. 140, 205 (2009) (arguing that
the “twentieth century saw the emergence and eventual triumph of presidential
unilateralism over international lawmaking.”).
349 See text and references supra note 53.
350
See Highlights: President Trump News Conference with UK Prime Minister
May,
RTÉ
(last
updated
July
13,
2018),
https://www.rte.ie/news/world/2018/0713/978496-donald-trump-presser/
[https://perma.cc/AU5Z-XLA3] (noting that the President said, “I would say I
would give our relationship in terms of grade the highest level of special.”). But
see Jeffrey A. Stacey, The Hollowing Out of the Special Relationship: The Bleak Future of
AFF.
(Sept.
5,
2017),
the
U.S.-British
Alliance,
FOREIGN
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-09-05/hollowing-out-specialrelationship [https://perma.cc/UV57-HVM5] (noting the deteriorating nature of
the UK U.S. relationship).
351
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EUROSTAT, SHARE OF MEMBER STATES IN EU GDP
(Apr. 10, 2017), http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news//DDN-20170410-1 [https://perma.cc/JR9A-DZU8] (noting that the UK accounts
for 16 percent of the EU’s GDP).
352
Wessel, supra note 332, at 15 (stressing that the other party’s consent to
copy-paste an agreement “should not be taken as a given” and that “in some cases
copy-pasting existing agreements to make them adjusted for the United Kingdom
would be less easy than it sounds as many of the provisions were tailor-made for
the EU-situation”).
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tion’s “America First” approach to foreign policy and treatymaking.353
In the mixed-bilateral setting, which only concerns one agreement that is in force in the case of the U.S., the UK’s case for continuity is somewhat stronger. Alongside the EU, it is one of the parties. This might seem to favor its continued status as a party postBrexit. However, here it is “essential to recall that these are not just
international agreements that the UK entered into individually,”354
but as an EU Member State. Hence, mixed agreements are still bilateral in nature, with the U.S. being a party “of the one part”, and
the EU and its Member States concluding it “of the other part”.355
Institutionally, moreover, mixed agreements reflect this bilateral
nature. For instance, in CETA, a joint committee that consists of
“representatives of the European Union and representatives of
Canada,” will be “co-chaired by the Minister for International
Trade of Canada and the Member of the European Commission responsible for Trade, or their respective designees.”356 Keeping the
UK in “would change the nature of a bilateral agreement to a multilateral agreement.”357
Therefore, it cannot be assumed the UK will remain a party
once it is no longer an EU Member State. As a consequence, “trilateralizing” erstwhile bilateral mixed agreements requires renegotiation of the text, necessitating the consent of the other parties. In
the case of the 2004 Galileo/GPS Agreement, its institutional setup
is less complex than CETA. Nonetheless, the “bilateral” nature of
the agreements is apparent here, too. For instance, it provides that
for consultations in the context of dispute settlement that,
“[r]epresentatives of the Council of the European Union and the
European Commission, of the one part, and of the United States, of
the other part, shall meet as needed.”358 The agreement clarifies,
353 See the President’s preface to the NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note
55, at i (observing an “America First foreign policy in action”, which puts an emphasis on “enforcing our borders, building trade relationships based on fairness
and reciprocity, and defending America’s sovereignty without apology.”).
354 See Wessel, supra note 332, at 17. See also Odermatt, supra note 49, at 1059–
60.
355
See Agreement on the Promotion, Provision and Use of Galileo and GPS
Satellite-Based Navigation Systems and Related Applications, supra note 79 (using
the formulation “of the one part”/“of the other part” at its outset).
356 CETA, supra note 108, at art. 26.1.1.
357 Wessel, supra note 332, at 20.
358
See Agreement on the Promotion, Provision and Use of Galileo and GPS
satellite-based navigation systems, supra note 79, at art. 17, ¶ 2.
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moreover, that “‘the Parties’ shall mean the European Community
or its Member States or the European Community and its Member
States, within their respective areas of competence, on the one
hand, and the United States, on the other.”359 It does not envisage
non-EU third countries as members.
Alternatively, the UK could accept ceasing to be a party to this
mixed agreement by officially withdrawing from it, or simply acquiescing into being ejected from it, and instead renegotiate a bilateral agreement with the U.S. However, since the agreement concerns an EU project, administered by the European Space Agency
(ESA), the UK’s stake and position remain unclear.360
In the multilateral setting, the distinction between mixed and
non-mixed needs to be kept in mind as well. The added difficulty
in maintaining continuity here stems from the possible need for
consent, not just from the U.S., but also the other parties. In the
non-mixed category, the 2005 Agreement on Duty-Free Treatment
of Multi-Chip Integrated Circuits (MCPs) serves as a rare multilateral example involving both the EU and the U.S. but not the Member States. The UK has never been a party in its own right, and
hence could not lay claim to such status post-Brexit. Hence, its options are to either conclude a bilateral agreement with the U.S. (and
possibly others) to that effect or join the multilateral agreement.
The latter is legally easy to achieve since the existing members
cannot veto acceptance in this particular case.361
The multilateral, mixed category is legally a more complex setting. However, in terms of retaining membership, the UK’s position is much stronger here. In the case of the Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation in Southeast Asia, the UK is a party in its own right
alongside the EU since 2012.362 Prominent examples of international organizations with mixed membership include the WTO and
359
Id. at art. 18. The agreement refers to the European Community because
it was concluded before the Lisbon Treaty created the EU as a single legal person.
See TEU, supra note 28, at art. 1, ¶ 3 (“The Union shall replace and succeed the European Community.”).
360
ESA is not an EU agency but a separate intergovernmental organization,
of which the UK is a member. See Framework Agreement between the European
Community and the European Space Agency, EU-ESA, Nov. 25, 2003, 2004 O.J. (L
261) 64 (establishing a framework for cooperation between the EU and the ESA).
361
Agreement on Duty-Free Treatment of Multi-Chip Integrated Circuits
(MCPs), supra note 167, at art. 7, lit. b (“This Agreement shall be open for acceptance by any Member of the WTO.”). The UK’s membership of the WTO postBrexit is not disputed.
362 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, supra note 160.
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Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO). In these two examples, the UK is a founding member, as is the U.S. Moreover, in
contrast to the bilateral mixed treaties, the UK is not only a party
by virtue of being an EU country, but at least partially in its own
right. This makes continued membership the presumption. As
confirmed in CJEU case law and “declarations of competence” issued in these multilateral settings, EU Member States also exercise
their own competences in these organizations,363 though their freedom of action is restricted by EU law (supra 3.3.). Post-Brexit—or
at least post-transition—these constraints will fall away. At the
same time, “the UK will become responsible for the implementation of all provisions,” including those that used to be covered by
the EU.364
Nevertheless, continuity of membership does not equate continuity of terms of membership. Consequently “the UK’s continued
participation may become subject to negotiations between the EU,
its Member States and third countries (including the UK in a new
special position).”365 In the case of the WTO, negotiations with affected WTO members may be necessary for agreeing on the UK’s
future tariff schedules and for the splitting up of the tariff rate quotas between it and the EU. Nonetheless, these will not affect the
UK’s status as a WTO member as such.366
It should be recalled, furthermore, that in more security363
See Opinion 1/94, supra note 205, at ¶ 105; see also Case C-240/09,
Lesoochranárske zoskupenie VLK v. Ministerstvo životného prostredia Slovenskej
republiky, 2011 E.C.R. I-01255, ¶ 31. See also Andrés Delgado Casteleiro, EU Declarations of Competence to Multilateral Agreements: A Useful Reference Base?, 17 EUR.
FOREIGN AFF. REV. 491, 492 (2012) (observing that issuing declarations of competence has become a common practice as “an attempt to apportion the responsibilities within a multilateral agreement based on who has competence (the EU
and/or its Member States) over the issue covered by the specific provisions of the
multilateral agreement”).
364 Wessel, supra note 332, at 21.
365
Id.; see also Peter Ungphakorn, Nothing Simple About UK regaining WTO
Status post-Brexit, INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV. (June 27, 2016),
https://www.ictsd.org/opinion/nothing-simple-about-uk-regaining-wto-statuspost-brexit [https://perma.cc/GHZ9-LKK6]; Aakanksha Mishra, A Post Brexit UK
in the WTO: The UK’s New GATT Tariff Schedule, in GETTING TO BREXIT: LEGAL
ASPECTS OF THE PROCESS OF THE UK’S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE EU 9, 9 (Jennifer A.
Hillman & Gary Horlick eds., 2017) (“There are certain ways by which the UK
could establish itself as a WTO member in its own right. However, each approach
is fraught with a set of complexities.”).
366
Lorand Bartels, The UK’s Status in the WTO Post-Brexit, in THE UNITED
KINGDOM AND THE FEDERAL IDEA 227, 229–32 (Robert Schütze & Stephen Tierney
eds., 2018) (detailing the UK’s status as an original member of the WTO with full
rights and responsibilities).
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oriented organizations such as the UN and NATO, the UK is a
member but not the EU (supra 3.3.2.). Hence, Brexit’s impact on its
continued status alongside the U.S. will be very limited, and also
because EU powers and obligations of “sincere cooperation” in the
security and defense field are already less invasive while being an
EU member.367 This again reveals that the real difficulty in “transatlantic trigonometry” is in the allegedly “low politics”, not the
“high politics” of security and defense, both in the bilateral and
multilateral sphere, for both existing and future agreements.
5.4. Parameters for New Agreements
Beyond ensuring continuity by finding replacements for EU
agreements, the UK will be freer post-Brexit—or in any event posttransition—to conclude new treaties with external partners. Given
the “special relationship” with the UK, the U.S. would be a logical
priority in such endeavors. However, the influence of the EU will
be felt even after the UK ceases to be an EU country, the extent of
which will be contingent on the future shape of the UK-EU-side of
the transatlantic triangle.
From a policy perspective, going beyond continuity fits the
theme of Global Britain as outlined in government papers, according to which the “UK intends to pursue new trade negotiations to
secure greater access to overseas markets for UK goods exports.”368
This appears to be indeed the primary focus of Global Britain, while
in security and defense matters the UK seeks close alignment with
the EU post-Brexit and continued reliance on NATO.369
This means that advances in post-Brexit bilateral U.S.-UK
transatlantic relations are likely to focus primarily on trade issues.
With no TTIP in existence that could be “rolled over”, the UK
would have to negotiate a trade agreement with the U.S. from
scratch. A new free trade agreement with the U.S. has been floated
ever since the referendum,370 with one of the stated aims of the UK367 Larik, supra note 191, at 187–89 (describing the limited legal effects of loyalty obligations in the CFSP).
368 UK DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 334, at 29.
369
See HM GOVERNMENT, FOREIGN POLICY, DEFENCE AND DEVELOPMENT: A
FUTURE PARTNERSHIP PAPER 19 (Sept. 12, 2017) (stating that “NATO will continue
to be the cornerstone of our security and the UK will continue to champion and
drive forward greater cooperation between the EU and NATO …”).
370
See, e.g., Benjamin Oreskes & Victoria Guida, The Bright Side of Brexit? A
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U.S. Trade and Investment Working Group being “to lay the
groundwork for a potential, future free trade agreement once the
UK has left the EU.”371
Such a new free trade agreement would be an example for the
new nature of the transatlantic treaty triangle. The UK-EU side of it
would no longer be governed by EU law and its “constitutional”
features.372 Hence, the international legal nature of all three sides
of this new trade triangle would be the same in nature, i.e., public
international law, possibly specified in the form of treaties. All this
may imply a large degree of freedom and flexibility, but several
economic, political and legal constraints apply.
In principle, post-Brexit and transition, the UK could even conclude a trade agreement with the U.S. before it does so with the
EU. However, there will be what could be termed a pull towards
“implicit sequencing” in negotiations in the transatlantic triangle,
as opposed to the “explicit sequencing” of withdrawal negotiations
(supra 2.2.). The main reason for this is the current economic reality that “[t]he UK exports almost half of its goods and services to
the EU—twice as much as to the U.S.”373 According to the study
conducted by RAND Europe, a scenario in which the UK and U.S.
would conclude an FTA, but in which the EU would have FTAs
with neither, would benefit the UK to some extent, yet “still be less
beneficial than an FTA with the EU.”374
Hence, the shape and content of the future UK-EU trade relationship will continue to loom over the UK-U.S. side even postBrexit, meaning that there is an incentive for the UK to clarify first
the future EU-UK trading relationship before finalizing the UKU.S. one. Having a clearer idea of the basis for negotiating a U.S.UK FTA makes sense also from a U.S. point of view. As noted by
Hamilton, “[b]efore Washington begins to negotiate a formal bilateral deal with the UK, it will want to understand … London’s end
goals with regard to a deal with the EU.”375
It is at this point that the different models of association with
U.S.-UK
Trade
Deal,
POLITICO
(June
24,
2016),
https://www.politico.com/story/2016/06/brexit-us-britain-trade-deal-224776
[https://perma.cc/623Z-92DY] (reporting on the likelihood of a new two-way
trade deal between the U.S. and the UK).
371 UK DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 337.
372 See Kadi v. Council, supra note 77, at ¶ 281.
373 HAMILTON & QUINLAN, supra note 8, at 2.
374 RIES ET AL., supra note 295, at 86.
375 HAMILTON, supra note 306, at 43.
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the EU and their transatlantic implications come to the fore (supra
4.). Depending how deep and specifically regulated this relationship will be, it will have varying degrees of impact on the UK’s
ability to strike a trade agreement with the U.S. For instance, a
Norway-type (EEA) or Swiss-type (set of bilateral agreements) arrangement will continue to hamper its freedom to maneuver and
to make concessions on regulatory issues that would deviate from
the acquis of EU law even beyond any transitional period. Similarly, a Turkey-style customs union hampers its ability to provide tariff concessions (in the areas covered by the customs union), and in
fact commit it to follow the EU’s lead in trade policy.
From the British Government’s official pronouncements to
date, neither of these more restrictive models involving a customs
unions or Norway or Swiss-style single market access is likely.376
Instead, a CETA-style agreement, i.e., a deep and comprehensive
free trade agreement potentially fleshed out with some form of
customs facilitation and free trade in goods in exchange for alignment with relevant EU regulations, appears to be the landing zone.
With regards to the U.S., the CETA-model would provide the
UK with maneuvering space in terms of tariffs and regulation, at
least legally speaking. A “right to regulate”377 inherent in such a
kind of FTA could come to be used as a “right to deregulate” or a
“right to diverge” from EU standards to accommodate U.S. interests. This may be necessary to make such a deal attractive to the
U.S. in the first place.
In terms of political economy, Britain will be the smaller
market facing an assertive “America First” approach. According to
RAND Europe, the sobering assessment is that “an FTA with the
UK would be of negligible macroeconomic benefit”378 to the U.S.
Hence, the latter can be expected to seek additional concessions to
make such a bilateral FTA worthwhile. On the one hand, “[s]ome
issues may be less difficult in U.S.-UK negotiations than they were
in TTIP, for instance, the EU’s insistence on ‘cultural exceptions’ or
geographic indications.”379 On the other hand, important obstacles
remain. Agriculture, for instance, could become a sensitive issue
politically, given that British farmers may not be “keen on a trade
376
See supra note 217 (providing official statements of the UK government’s
stance on the future relationship between the UK and the EU).
377 See CETA, supra note 108, at 8.
378 RIES ET AL., supra note 295, at 86.
379 HAMILTON, supra note 306, at 44.
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deal that would open them up to U.S. competition at the very time
they are losing generous EU subsidies.”380 Moreover, issues that
already troubled the TTIP negotiations, such as food and animal
standards, like the infamous “chlorine chicken”, will resurface in
the context of a U.S.-UK FTA.381 Other likely contentious points
are public procurement and sensitive domestic areas such as
healthcare.382
The UK may want to acquiesce to some of the American demands in order to have a deal, if only for political window dressing. Nevertheless, even if accommodating U.S. interests (and thus
ensuring U.S. constitutional hurdles will be met more easily), the
UK remains constrained by two more factors. The first is UK domestic politics and the UK’s “foreign relations law.” Given wide
discretion of the government due to the “royal prerogative” in
treaty-making, it is legally largely unencumbered, though unlike
situations that concern “continuity” that are about the status quo
and are covered by enabling legislation such as the Trade Bill (supra 4.3.), it could face fiercer political opposition and subsequent
problems when it comes to implementation by Parliament.383
The second is EU law regulating access to the internal market,
under the penumbra of which the UK remains, which brings out
once more the triangular nature of the transatlantic relationship
post-Brexit. This puts the British government in a difficult position. On the one hand, the closer the UK stays aligned with EU
regulations, the less maneuvering space it has for accommodating
U.S. interests. On the other hand, UK producers and service providers would still need to comply with relevant EU rules if they
want to fully benefit from a new CETA-style UK-EU FTA, in addition to undergoing customs and rules of origin checks that will
have to be introduced. If British products do not meet EU safety
standards or content requirements to qualify for the benefits under
a future FTA, they will not be able to receive the preferential
treatment granted by the agreement. In such a scenario, according
Id. at 45.
Richard Partington, Trump Adviser Ross says UK-US Trade Deal will mean
Nov.
6,
2017,
Scrapping
EU
Rules,
GUARDIAN,
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/nov/06/trump-ross-says-uk-ustrade-deal-eu-brexit-chlorinated-chicken [https://perma.cc/55AP-6T5Y] (warning that any post-Brexit deal with the U.S. will depend on the UK discarding rules
set by Brussels).
382
HAMILTON, supra note 306, at 45 (noting that other market access issues
may arise due to the UK’s concern regarding certain U.S. restrictions on trade).
383 See generally supra note 346.
380
381
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to the so-called “Brussels effect,” even with the UK no longer being
in the EU, adapting to the latter’s generally stricter regulations
would allow British businesses to trade on both sides of the Atlantic,384 rather than having to choose one over the other.
An even more ambitious model for future transatlantic trade
relations is a trilateral, revamped (and possibly renamed) TTIPstyle agreement. The parties to such an agreement would be the
UK, the EU (and possibly the Member States), and the U.S. According to the RAND Europe report, this would be the economically most advantageous scenario for all sides.385 Legally and politically, however, such an agreement will be extremely difficult to
realize. Turning already troubled TTIP talks into three-way negotiations including the UK following an acrimonious Brexit process
does not create a promising starting point. Moreover, it would require, among other things, an institutional redesign of the agreement into a “trilateral” relationship. A Joint Committee would
have to include members from all three sides. In addition, all three
would have to have a say in appointing and selecting members of
inter-party and possibly investor-state dispute settlement bodies.386
A more realistic—though still more long-term scenario—is that of
working incrementally towards a more open and better coordinated “North Atlantic Marketplace” in a way that avoids past pitfalls
and dead ends.387
In the multilateral sphere, not much new is to be expected. In
contrast to the continuity scenario, this would entail the U.S. and
UK joining or creating new multilateral treaties and organizations.
Global Britain certainly professes a multilateral dimension.388 However, this is not reciprocated by the current U.S. administration,
384 Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 5 (2012) (“Trading
with the EU requires foreign companies to adjust their conduct or production to
EU standards—which often represent the most stringent standards—or else forgo
the EU market entirely.”).
385 RIES ET AL., supra note 295, at 57–58 and 67 (contending that the largest potential gains for all three partners would arise from this scenario).
386 See generally supra note 357.
387
HAMILTON, supra note 306, at 22–24 (explaining the potential benefits of a
North Atlantic Marketplace).
388 See HM GOVERNMENT, supra note 369, at 2 (“The UK will also continue to .
. . be a champion of the UN and multilateralism . . . ”). See also, UK DEPARTMENT
FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 334, at 25 (“Already a champion of multilateral trade from within the EU, the UK is preparing to take on an even greater role
in the WTO outside the EU …”); Political Declaration Setting out the Framework
for the Future Relationship, supra note 45, at pt. 6 (“The Parties also reaffirm their
commitment to promoting effective multilateralism.”).
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which has shown a preference for bilateral rather than multilateral
approaches.389 Examples include the “unsigning” of the TransPacific Partnership390 and withdrawing from the Paris Climate Accord, the Iran Nuclear Deal, and the UN Human Rights Council.391
In the security and defense field, the limited impetus of Brexit
for new transatlantic multilateral approaches will become evident.
The UK’s NATO membership will remain unaffected, while the
British government has expressed a preference for very close association with the EU’s CSDP. It offered the EU “a future relationship that is deeper than any current third country partnership,”
which should be “unprecedented in its breadth, taking in cooperation on foreign policy, defence and security, and development.”392
As seen above, there exist already facilities for third country contributions, contingent on EU approval, that could form the basis for
such a partnership, and which are not mutually exclusive with
NATO and bilateral UK-U.S. cooperation (supra 5.1.).
Third-country associations with the EU’s CSDP would also
lead to an “open triangle” involving the U.S. and UK as external
contributors. As noted above, the U.S. already has such an arrangement in place (supra 3.2.1.). The UK could either replicate
this or seek a more enhanced form of association, as expressed in
its “future partnership paper,” including third-country association
with the newly activated PESCO (supra 5.1.). Consequently, the
U.S. and UK could find themselves both contributing to certain EU
missions in the future, when they decide to do so. However, given
that third-country participation in such missions needs to respect
389
See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2017 TRADE POLICY
AGENDA AND 2016 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (Mar. 2017) (noting that U.S. trade policy
goals “can be best accomplished by focusing on bilateral negotiations rather than
multilateral negotiations …”).
390
Peter Baker, Trump Abandons Trans-Pacific Partnership, Obama’s Signature
Trade
Deal,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Jan.
23,
2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/23/us/politics/tpp-trump-trade-nafta.html
[https://perma.cc/Y9T4-8CC7].
391 See Joris Larik, The EU’s Global Strategy, Brexit and “America First”, 23 EUR.
FOREIGN AFF. REV. 343, 361–62 (2018) (summarizing the international legal commitments from which the U.S. has withdrawn under the Trump Administration).
See also HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2018) (providing an extensive account and critique of the Trump Administration’s approach to international law).
392
HM GOVERNMENT, supra note 369, at 18. See also Political Declaration Setting out the Framework for the Future Relationship, supra note 45, pt. 80 (“With a
view to Europe’s security and the safety of their respective citizens, the Parties
should establish a broad, comprehensive and balanced security partnership.”).
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the “decision-making autonomy” of the EU,393 the triangular relationship framed by the CSDP would be lopsided towards the latter.
Lastly, apart from new international agreements and treatybased organizations, more flexible forms of collaboration are available. For instance, recalling the Iran Nuclear Deal and its
“P5+1”/“E3+3” format,394 such approaches are easily adaptable to
the post-Brexit world. Institutionally, it would mean that the UK
continues to take part in this grouping, but henceforth in its own
right completely, whereas France and Germany continue to see
their participation in part, as an exercise of the Union’s Common
Foreign and Security Policy. In short, formats such as “E3+3”
would simply become “E2+4”—or “E2+3” in case the U.S. refrains
from taking part.
In sum, the new treaty arrangements post-Brexit in the transatlantic tringle will be mostly focused on trade and regulation, where
there exist important and visible trade-offs and costs. Adaptation
in the security and defense field will be easier, at least as far as legal arrangements are concerned and as long as interests converge.
In both fields, it is unlikely to see the new triangular relationship
cast in the form of trilateral treaties, be it a three-way TTIP or security arrangement. Instead, from the point of view of international
law, such triangles will more likely manifest themselves as sets of
partially co-dependent bilateral agreements.
6. CONCLUSION
This article illustrated how Brexit is not only a cause for upheaval in the UK and the EU, but also for relations with the U.S.
Having traced the developments leading up to the UK officially
negotiating its withdrawal from the bloc, and having scrutinized
the legal relations as they currently stand, the alternative models
that exist, and finally the possible ways forward for the UK, U.S.
and EU, three main conclusions can be drawn.
First, the transatlantic impact of Brexit is in the first place an
empirical challenge. Beyond a general sense that the UK will have
to renegotiate numerous international agreements with its partners, closer analysis of databases and compendia reveals that it is
not always clear what is exactly at stake. However, there are two
393
394

See supra note 138.
See Harnisch, supra note, at 160.
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consoling factors. The existing treaty relations between the U.S.
and the EU and its (remaining) Member States remain in place, as
will existing bilateral U.S.-UK treaties. In addition, the number of
agreements to be replicated by the UK is manageable—at least for
the U.S., which only has to go through this exercise once. Nevertheless, there is no time to be wasted for preparing replication and
renegotiation in order to avoid unforeseen effects and protracted
legal uncertainty.
Second, coping with the transatlantic fallout of Brexit requires
doctrinal clarity about the nature of the relations at stake. Hence,
this Article argued that transatlantic treaty relations need to be understood as both triangular and multilevel. Failing to understand
the importance of how the foreign relations laws of the U.S., the
UK, and the EU and its remaining Member States means failing to
appreciate how the nature and content of different international
agreements affect their chances of successful negotiation, ratification, and implementation by the different actors in the transatlantic
space. These relationships, moreover, are interdependent, making
their recalibration an exercise of “transatlantic trigonometry.” In
particular, the close ties that EU membership exerts on its Member
States, and any form of close association the UK might have with
the EU in the future, will continue to loom large.
Third, achieving a “kinder, gentler Brexit”395 in the transatlantic
context is a political challenge with many moving parts. Not only
are the governments in the U.S. and UK implementing their respective visions of “America First” and Global Britain, but also the EU
has been propelled on a course of reform and activism. While the
near-term will be about continuity, fitting the different pieces of
the transatlantic space back together is neither impossible nor an
inevitability. Legally, upsetting existing relationships can be minimized, though it will be a matter of negotiations and hence come
with adjustments based on the shifted power relations. In an effort
to “take back control” from the EU, to use the favorite slogan of the
Leave-campaign and Brexiteers,396 the UK is in fact on a course to
handing control over many international engagements to its external partners, whose consent will be required in many instances for
continuing existing agreements and for putting in place new ones.
Avoiding disruption—perhaps counterintuitively—has been
shown to be easier, legally and politically, in the “sovereignty sen395
396

Weiler, supra note, at 6.
ARMSTRONG, supra note 3, at 65.
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sitive” fields of security and defense, while deeper integration and
more apparent trade-offs in the trade and regulatory sphere turn
the latter into the principal arena for a drawn-out struggle for the
shape of future relations.
Two hundred and twenty-two years ago, George Washington
used his farewell address to caution his fellow citizens against “interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, [as this
would] entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European
ambition, rivalship, interest, humor or caprice[.]”397 To some, Brexit may be seen as European “rivalship” and “caprice” par excellence
and proof of the first President’s considerable prescience. Nonetheless, in view of the many hundreds of treaties that link the two
sides of the Atlantic together, and in view of the immense trade
flows, as well as enduring political and personal connections between them, entanglement is a reality in law and fact. Hence, for
the sake of the future of the transatlantic relationship, now is not
the time—to use Washington’s words once more—to show “infidelity to existing engagements” but to recall that “[h]armony, liberal intercourse with all nations, are recommended by policy, humanity, and interest.”398

397 WASHINGTON’S FAREWELL ADDRESS 1796, AVALON PROJECT,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/washing.asp
[https://perma.cc/WP9H-WACC] (last visited Jan. 28, 2018).
398 Id.
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